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THE SUM OF ITS PARTS:  
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP 
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
Jeremy R. McClane* 
 
This Article examines the impact of the quality of a lawyer’s working 
relationship with his or her client on one of the most important types of 
capital markets deal in a company’s existence:  its initial public offering 
(IPO).  Drawing on data from interviews with equity capital markets 
lawyers at major law firms, and analyzing data from IPOs in the United 
States registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission between 
June 1996 and December 2010, this study finds a strong association 
between several measures of IPO performance and the familiarity between 
the lead underwriter and its counsel, as measured by the number of times a 
particular law firm serves as counsel to a managing underwriter within a 
relatively short time period.  Performance is gauged according to a stock’s 
opening day returns, price performance over thirty, sixty, and ninety 
trading days, correct price revision, litigation rates, and the speed at which 
deals are completed.  I also analyze the relationships between the lawyers 
for the lead underwriter and the lawyers for the issuer.  The analysis shows 
some benefits from familiarity, albeit generally smaller than those 
associated with the underwriter-lawyer relationship.  In all cases, the 
positive effects of repeated interaction diminish the further back in time the 
previous collaborations occurred.  To rule out selection and reverse 
causality, I perform a number of tests using smaller subsets of the data to 
remove observations that are plausibly selection driven.  I also show that 
the relationships between familiarity and deal quality occur independently 
of the level of the lawyers’ experience. 
These findings support the conclusion that lawyers’ relational skill can 
positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of substance and 
process knowledge.  I hypothesize that the core advantage of repeated 
interaction is the formation of more effective lawyer-client team dynamics. 
 
 
*  Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I am indebted for the 
helpful advice and input of many friends and colleagues in undertaking this project.  In 
particular, I am grateful for advice and feedback from Bob Bordone, Stephen Burbank, Jill 
Fisch, Jonah Gelbach, James Kwak, Patricia McCoy, Peter Siegelman, Joseph Singer, 
Michael Sinkinson, Tobias Barrington Wolff, and workshop participants at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law, Cardozo School of Law, and the University of Richmond 
School of Law.  All errors are my own. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To what extent does familiarity among lawyers, and between lawyers and 
their clients, impact the outcome of a deal, even independently of the 
lawyers’ expertise?  The question is significant given that clients frequently 
choose their counsel based, at least in part, on relationships and past 
experiences with counsel.1  The question is also important as part of the 
ongoing discussion of what value lawyers add for clients generally.2  In a 
transactional setting, as in many others, lawyers do not perform their work 
in isolation, but in concert with clients and other parties who shepherd 
transactions to completion.3  The output of a transaction is a collective work 
product, and therefore, an inquiry of what value lawyers add cannot be 
disentangled from an inquiry of what value can be created through effective 
working relationships amongst lawyers and clients.4  And while many 
would agree that there are intangible benefits from familiarity, it is not 
obvious that lawyers’ relationships with clients or other counsel would add 
any quantifiable value to the handling of a matter.  Indeed, familiarity might 
just as easily destroy value if it causes lawyers to take a client relationship 
for granted, makes a law firm difficult to fire because of interpersonal 
concerns, or interferes with counsel’s ability to make objective judgments 
about the client’s issues. 
This Article reports the initial findings of a research program to study the 
working relationships between lawyers and their clients, as well as lawyers 
and their opposing counsel, in the transactional setting.  The study focuses 
on a particular type of transaction—the initial public offering (IPO) of a 
company’s stock—and draws upon data from interviews with equity capital 
markets practitioners who work on such deals, as well as publicly available 
data on deal performance. 
The results provide evidence that the quality of the working relationship 
between a lawyer and his or her client, as well as relationships between a 
lawyer and the counsel on the other side of the transaction, have a 
significant impact on deal performance in the context of IPOs.  The study 
adds to the literature about the nature of lawyers’ relationships with their 
 
 1. See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Team, Firms and Lawyers:  Evidence of the 
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1028–
30 (2011) (finding that in-house legal counsel rely on relationships and prior experience with 
law firms when selecting counsel). 
 2. For one of the more famous articulations of, and answers to, that question, see 
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 
YALE L.J. 239 (1984). 
 3. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information:  Initial Public Offerings, 
Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995) 
(describing a theory of IPO transactions in which lawyers act as one part of a larger 
endeavor by bankers, accountants, and other parties to produce information). 
 4. See Jon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Discipline of Teams, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 111, 112 (describing team outputs as “a collective work-product 
reflect[ing] the joint, real contribution of team members”). 
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clients5 and provides quantitative evidence of the benefits that a good 
working relationship can yield in a transactional setting. 
To provide this evidence, I analyze the impact of repeated collaborations 
between managing underwriters and the various legal counsel they employ 
in the IPO process, as a proxy of better working relationships.  I also 
analyze the impact of repeated interactions between different sets of 
counsel on IPO transactions within a relatively short period.  I find a strong 
association between the number of times a particular law firm and bank 
work together within the preceding one, two, and three years and better deal 
outcomes, as gauged by a stock’s opening day returns and price 
performance over thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, as well as the time 
to completion of each deal.  The impact on stock performance decreases the 
further back in time successive lawyer-client interactions go.  To rule out 
selection, I perform an analysis using smaller samples of only the most 
prestigious and experienced banks and perform other tests on subsets of the 
data that exclude observations that could plausibly be the product of 
selection.  I also show that frequent interaction between lawyers and their 
clients is associated with deals that are more accurately priced (as indicated 
by an increasing probability of correct upward price revision for each prior 
representation) and completed more quickly (as indicated by increasingly 
faster deal completion from the filing date of the preliminary prospectus for 
each prior representation).  In addition, I show that relational effects as 
proxied by repeated interactions impact deal outcomes independently of the 
experience of the lawyers involved. 
These findings provide evidence that lawyers’ familiarity and relational 
skill can positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of their level 
of experience with regard to substantive legal expertise.  I hypothesize that 
the core advantage of repeated interaction is the generation of trust and 
familiarity, leading to more effective lawyer-client team dynamics.  That 
explanation is consistent with research on teams indicating that repeated 
interaction among team members fosters lower error rates and better team 
outputs,6 as well as the accounts of practicing lawyers gleaned from 
interviews.  The basic conclusion to which the literature points is that 
frequent collaboration is a product of frequent interaction, and groups who 
collaborate form better teams.  Better teamwork in turn produces overall 
better performance in the negotiation of capital markets transactions, 
leading to better information product, more efficient allocation of marketing 
 
 5. See, e.g., Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1000 (reporting the results of a survey 
of corporate in-house counsel finding that large companies keep a stable of preferred law 
firms to provide services; that relationships are important to selection of counsel; and that 
clients focus on teams and departments, as well as entire firms and individuals, in choosing 
firms); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?  Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-
Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2010) (arguing that the relationship 
between corporate counsel and corporate clients resembles a strategic alliance or partnership 
more than an agency relationship). 
 6. See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON 
SMALL GROUPS 245, 250 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (discussing research on teams 
indicating that repeated team interactions lead to lower rates of error, among other things). 
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efforts, and ultimately better stock performance.  The broader implication 
of this conclusion is that the model of lawyer-client relationship in 
transactions should incorporate a consideration of the team dynamics 
involved as well as more traditional principal and agent roles. 
This research brings a previously unexplored perspective to the study of 
securities law and transactional lawyering.  To date, despite a large body of 
research on IPO transactions7 and the role of lawyers in deal making,8 no 
studies have sought to investigate the impact of collaboration on IPO deals.  
Scholarship in the past several decades has supported the idea that 
cooperation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society 
as a whole, and much research has focused on finding ways to foster it in 
the legal profession.9  However, these studies have not focused on the 
quality of working relationships between the various parties involved in a 
group production process like an IPO.10 
Because my goal is to explore individuals’ interactions, and by extension 
the familiarity among the lawyers and bankers conducting deals, I limit the 
time frames to the one year, two years, and three years preceding each deal.  
I gather data from interviews with professionals in law firms, investment 
banks, and institutional investment firms to understand their perceptions of 
the impact of familiarity and to supplement the statistical analysis by 
unpacking the causal mechanisms and meanings that the numbers do not 
reveal.  I examine a number of outcome-related variables for which data is 
available, including price performance, informational completeness 
(evidenced by disclosure), probability of securities litigation, length of time 
from the initiation of the deal to the offering date, and decimal versus 
 
 7. See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE:  EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 275–355 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing 
the voluminous empirical finance literature on IPOs). 
 8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers As Transaction Cost Engineers, in THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 508–14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); 
Gilson, supra note 2, at 240–44; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:  
Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1995)  
 9. See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents 
Enhance Cooperation?  Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 331–33 (1997) 
(examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in improving 
cooperation); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:  
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550 
(1994); see also James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering:  A New Development in 
Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 431–35 (2002) (discussing the 
professionalization of collaborative lawyering approaches).  The type of cooperation that 
these studies deal with is distinct from teamwork, as it is used in this Article.  Cooperation, 
as used in other research, refers to the lawyers on opposite sides of litigation revealing 
information and working to come to a swift resolution for their clients. See Gilson & 
Mnookin, supra, at 550.  Teamwork includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing 
the working relationships between all parties, including the lawyers, clients, and other 
outside experts, largely subsuming adversarialism in pursuit of a common goal. 
 10. Cf. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as 
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum 
of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used in team 
production belong to one person”). 
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integer pricing (an indicator of a well negotiated final price).  I control for a 
number of other factors that affect performance commonly employed in the 
literature on IPOs.  Appendix Figure A sets out the variables analyzed and 
standard controls used. 
The results are generally illustrated by Figure 1 below, showing the 
relationship present in the raw data between the IPO stock’s performance 
on the first day of trading (the first day “bounce” if the change is positive) 
and the number of times in the preceding year an underwriter has 
collaborated with its counsel, as well as the number of times the two sets of 
law firms involved in the deal have encountered each other working on an 
IPO.  As Figure 1 shows, repeated interactions bear a linear relationship to 
an incrementally increasing opening day bounce.  The pattern remains in 
regression analyses controlling for factors that may also influence the first 
day bounce, as detailed below. 
The trend in first day bounce has mixed implications but is generally a 
positive result for the underwriter and its counsel.  A large first day price 
increase indicates that the stock was priced at a level lower than what the 
market would bear, at least in the short term.  Because underwriters are 
typically compensated by commission (usually around 7 percent) on the 
gross proceeds of the offering at its initial price, the large first day bounce 
appears at first blush to represent money that the underwriter leaves on the 
table.11  However, underpriced IPOs are a ubiquitous phenomenon, and it is 
widely believed that a moderate first day bounce indicates a successful 
transaction.12  This is because a healthy first day bounce purportedly 
generates publicity for the offering, attracts investor interest, and allays the 
possibility of an undersubscribed offering.13  For these reasons, 
underwriters are reported to underprice IPOs intentionally by approximately 
10 to 15 percent of the stock’s expected market value once it is fully 
distributed.14 
 
 11. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing:  A Legal and Economic Analysis of 
the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 
590–99 (2004). 
 12. See generally Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation, 
and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Tim Loughran 
& Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2004, 
at 5, 5–37; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 
57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002). See also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of 
Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 18–22 (1993) 
(describing underpricing and critiquing litigation avoidance theories for it); James C. 
Spindler, IPO Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 94, 2009), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1105&context=usclwps-lewps (analyzing explanations of underpricing) 
[http://perma.cc/BDM5-3U8D].  For a review of the finance literature discussing 
underpricing, see generally Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE:  EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 375–422 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) 
(reviewing the literature on underpricing). 
 13. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 599–618 (explaining the potential benefits for 
underwriters and issuers of a significant first day price increase). 
 14. Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a certain level of underpricing 
intentionally, typically around 15 percent of the stock’s expected equilibrium trading price.  
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Figure 1:  Repeated Counsel Interactions and First Day Bounce 
 
Moreover, even though a high first day bounce—indicating high levels of 
underpricing—represents a significant loss of money to the underwriter 
because it results in lower commissions, underwriters have been able to 
garner significant value from underpriced offerings through trading 
commissions and future services from preferred clients, who profit from 
buying into the underpriced offerings.15  Therefore, whether the result 
 
The purpose of the underpricing is reported to be ensuring strong demand and mitigating the 
impact of hedge funds and other investors “flipping” the stock in the market.  For example, 
sealed documents from the eToys litigation made public in early 2013 feature a Goldman 
Sachs pitchbook stating that an IPO should be priced at a “10–15% discount to the expected 
fully distributed trading level [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1–3 months 
after the offering.” Joe Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs:  The Documents, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/nocera-
goldman-sachs-etoys.html (publishing sealed documents from the case eToys Inc. ex rel. 
Post Effective Date Committee v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 02/601805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2002)) [http://perma.cc/5M3X-V8HP]. 
 15. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810 (explaining underpricing as a form of 
compensation to investors for past business and inducement for future business:  “If 
underwriters are given discretion in share allocations, the discretion will not automatically 
be used in the best interests of the issuing firm.  Underwriters might intentionally leave more 
money on the table then [sic] necessary, and then allocate these shares to favored buy-side 
clients.  There is some evidence that underpriced share allocations have been used by 
underwriters to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid pro quos . . . to curry favor with the 
executives of other prospective IPO issuers in a practice known as “spinning” . . . or even to 
influence politicians” (citations omitted)); see also Nocera, supra note 14 (disclosing 
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shown in Figure 1 represents excessive underpricing or not, it indicates an 
increasingly positive deal outcome for the underwriter. 
This relationship between first day price performance and repeated 
interaction, as well as other results, is further elaborated below.  All 
specifications in the empirical model include controls for each industry, 
each year, and other confounds, and all of the results are significant at the 
10 percent level, with the majority significant at the 5 percent level using 
robust standard errors clustered by industry, year, and lead underwriter.  It 
should be noted that the quantitative and qualitative empirical methods used 
in this Article each have their limits, as will be further discussed.  
Nonetheless, the results survive numerous tests for robustness as well as 
tests to rule out selection.  Moreover, the results are consistent with existing 
theory, other empirical literature, and practitioner understanding of IPO 
deals, such that they provide strong support for this Article’s conclusions. 
Part I of this Article describes the IPO process, generally, and the roles of 
the relevant parties, in particular the lawyers.  This part also reviews the 
literature relevant to counsels’ role in IPO transactions and develops 
testable hypotheses about the impact of repeated interactions.  Part II 
describes the data and methodology of this study and discusses the 
statistical results of the hypothesis testing.  Part III explains the assumptions 
employed in the study and the limitations of the methodology.  Part III also 
discusses the normative and policy implications of the results. 
I.  IPO PRICING AND THE LAWYERS’ ROLE 
IN TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT 
Before delving into the analysis of lawyer-client interactions, it is useful 
to discuss the prevailing theory about how lawyers add value in transactions 
and what specific features of a lawyer’s work in IPOs align with that 
theory.  One of the first actions taken by both underwriters and issuing 
companies about to go public is to appoint legal counsel to assist in the 
process.16  The lawyers are essential to the transaction from the very 
beginning.17  Lawyers can influence the outcome of a capital markets 
transaction in any number of ways, but the most obvious mechanisms at 
 
documents indicating that the underwriter profited through various kinds of reciprocal 
investor paybacks).  As one commentator has illustrated: 
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients were sitting 
on a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock started trading on the open 
market.  In most cases, the clients cashed out—which was smart, because eToys 
didn’t stay at those levels for long.  But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits 
in trading commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions, compared to 
that $11.5 million in fees. 
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-really-make-money-on-ipos/ 
[http://perma.cc/SP8V-9MN2]. 
 16. Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public:  Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1981) (discussing the importance of the issuing company’s advisors, 
including its counsel, when beginning an IPO). 
 17. See id. 
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work in IPOs are the lawyer’s ability to influence the information available 
to the market via disclosure and the lawyer’s ability to reduce transaction 
costs.  These mechanisms were famously articulated in Professor Ronald 
Gilson’s description of the lawyer as “transaction cost engineer.”18  The 
“transaction cost engineer” description starts by accepting the validity of 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which provides a theoretical 
basis for calculating the expected return on a given asset, given the asset’s 
risk characteristics.19  The “transaction cost engineer” explanation of 
lawyering posits that lawyers contribute to better deals through services that 
cause financial products or transactions to conform to the assumptions 
underlying the CAPM.20  In the context of financial instruments, one way 
that lawyers do this is by helping to create products whose risk and return 
profiles are conveyed accurately and comprehensibly to participants in the 
markets, such that the market can efficiently value such products.  In the 
following sections, I describe the tasks that lawyers perform in IPOs that fit 
the “transaction cost engineer” description, and I explain how these tasks 
are the product of collaboration with clients as well as other sets of lawyers, 
as opposed to individual efforts by any particular set of counsel. 
A.  Lawyers and Information Production in IPOs 
An IPO is a company’s introduction to the public markets, and therefore 
gathering and disseminating information about the issuing company and its 
prospects is one of the most important components of the transaction.  It 
follows that one means by which lawyers can influence the performance of 
an IPO is through their central role producing information about the issuing 
company. 
1.  The Role of Lawyers and Their Clients in Producing Information 
From the outset of the IPO process, the lawyers for the underwriters and 
the lawyers for the issuing company will play an important role in creating 
the information product that will be used to price and market the issuing 
 
 18. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 255 (arguing that lawyers add value in transactions by 
“devising efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s 
hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting 
transactions in this world”); see also Gilson, supra note 8, at 508–14; Gilson & Mnookin, 
supra note 8, at 2–4. 
 19. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model:  
Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2004, at 25, 25–30 (describing the 
capital asset pricing model and research on its validity).  The model provides a means of 
estimating the non-diversifiable risk of an asset—the risk that cannot be offset by including 
the asset in a diversified portfolio.  The risk corresponds to the return an investor should 
expect on the asset to compensate for that risk. Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier 
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–62 n.41 (1984); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years 
Later:  The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2003). 
 20. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 254. 
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company’s stock.21  This task will first involve a due diligence review, in 
which the lawyers and the underwriter thoroughly investigate the issuing 
company’s business.22  During the due diligence review, the attorneys will 
gather and verify information for the prospectus, which in turn helps to 
manage liability risk from material omissions and misstatements.23  Typical 
legal due diligence often includes a review of material contracts, related 
party transactions, cross default provisions, negative pledge agreements, 
and rights of third parties to terminate contracts.24  Due diligence requires 
involvement of the issuing company, which gathers the relevant 
information for the lawyers to review.  It also necessarily involves the 
underwriters, who may raise questions or ask for verification on particular 
matters during the process.25 
While due diligence progresses, the lawyers for both the issuer and the 
underwriters are heavily involved in drafting the prospectus, which is the 
main document through which the newly issued securities will be 
marketed.26  The prospectus is usually drafted iteratively in meetings 
involving both sets of counsel and their clients and through a series of 
exchanged drafts.27  Counsel for the issuer typically takes the lead in 
drafting the prospectus and thus has a large amount of control over the 
draft,28 but the underwriter’s counsel has significant impact as well.29  The 
issuing company’s management, as well as representatives from the 
underwriter, provides input throughout the process, as each has a direct 
interest in how the document is drafted.30  The underwriter can often play a 
significant role by providing precedent documents at the outset of the 
transaction, thus setting the template from which the deal documentation 
draws.31 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations specify the 
information that must be disclosed32 and also require that the prospectus 
 
 21. See Utset, supra note 3, at 277 (describing the lawyers’ job in an IPO to be the 
production of an information bundle). 
 22. See Royce de Rohan Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel As Gatekeeper or 
Turnstile:  An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP. 
MKTS L.J. 164, 167 (2007). 
 23. See id.; see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 24. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 167 (explaining the details of the lawyers’ 
involvement in the IPO process). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. (“This drafting is an iterative process, as knowledge gained in due diligence 
informs what needs to be said about the issuer.”). 
 28. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in preparing the 
registration statement is normally the attorney for the company.  Company counsel is 
principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of the registration statement.”). 
 29. See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the company, the 
underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”). 
 30. See id. at 14, 18. 
 31. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014) (name withheld by request) 
(on file with author). 
 32. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.915 (2014).  Required disclosure includes:  
(1) information about the company’s business, see id. §§ 229.101–229.103; (2) the 
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disclosure not be misleading.33  Moreover, the prospectus must not contain 
any material misstatements or omissions,34 with “material” defined as 
“matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor 
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered.”35  Applying the materiality standard requires legal analysis and 
judgment, and lawyers play a significant role deciding what is necessary to 
disclose.36  Nonetheless, the prospectus is a marketing document as well as 
a regulatory one, and the underwriter typically has requirements of its own 
that make the prospectus a more effective tool for marketing purposes.37  
Additionally, the issuing company usually takes a strong interest in how its 
story is told.38  Thus, the drafting process requires collaboration between all 
the parties and requires counsel to work closely with each other and with 
both sets of clients. 
The due diligence process continues throughout the drafting of the 
prospectus, and can continue even after the filing of a preliminary version 
prospectus with the SEC.39  The SEC’s review of the preliminary 
prospectus typically involves several rounds of comments and requests for 
clarifications, additions, or alterations to the disclosure, each of which must 
be addressed.40  During the time that the SEC is reviewing the preliminary 
prospectus, the underwriter and issuer’s management engage in marketing 
efforts.41  The lead underwriter and issuer’s management market the stock 
by visiting institutional investors in various cities and presenting the 
company’s story as set out in the preliminary prospectus.42  Through this 
process (known as a “road show” or “dog and pony show”), the underwriter 
 
management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition of the company, including 
future projections if desired, see id. § 229.303; (3) financial statements and an auditor’s 
opinion covering them, see id. § 210; (4) a description of material contracts, see id. §§ 
229.10–229.915; (5) information about legal and regulatory problems facing the company, 
see id. § 229.103; (6) information about the officers and directors of the company and their 
compensation, see id. §§ 229.403–405; and (7) certain industry specific information, see 
generally SEC, INDUSTRY GUIDES, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/XY8S-G6L2]. 
 33. See § 230.408. 
 34. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Exchange Act of 
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. 
 36. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (reviewing the process by which lawyers 
negotiate and draft the prospectus disclosure and concluding that it is a 
“process . . . involving the exercise of judgment”). 
 37. See id.; Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14. 
 38. Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14, 18. 
 39. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, Strategic Disclosure and the Pricing of 
Initial Public Offerings 2 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://server1.tepper. 
cmu.edu/Seminars/docs/hanley_hoberg_March.pdf [http://perma.cc/VXA7-MDKY]. 
 40. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 45–50 (discussing the SEC comment and 
review process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under 
the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65, 70–72 (1996) (describing the SEC staff’s role 
in the registration and disclosure process). 
 41. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 22 (noting that the “red herrings” are 
distributed after filing and while the SEC reviews the filing). 
 42. See id. 
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assesses the demand for the stock by building a book of indicative orders 
from interested investors.43  Because the Securities Act prohibits public 
offers or sales of the stock before the prospectus is finalized and approved, 
investor orders cannot yet be binding.44  Moreover, information given to the 
investors during the road show must conform to what is contained in the 
preliminary prospectus.45 
When the marketing effort is complete, the lead underwriter negotiates 
with the issuing company’s management to set a final price for the stock 
based largely on the investor demand ascertained during the road show.46  
Once the final price is negotiated, a final version of the prospectus and final 
pricing information are deemed effective by the SEC.47  The shares are then 
sold to the investors at the final price, and the company goes public.48 
Throughout this process, the lawyers for both the issuer and the 
underwriter play a key role verifying and synthesizing historical 
information and producing new information that may be needed by offering 
a legal interpretation of key issues in the deal.49  In addition, counsel are 
often responsible for helping to produce accurate information about 
 
 43. See id. at 22–23; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES 
REGULATION 115, 122–25 (11th ed. 2009) (describing the road show and bookbuilding 
process); Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168–69 (describing the development of an 
offering price and using the initial filing range as a proxy for the estimate developed during 
the “beauty contest”). 
 44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 114 
(“Sales are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also cannot accept customers’ oral offers 
to buy.  But the underwriters can ‘build their book,’ collecting non-binding indications of 
interest from customers, which they hope to convert into sales once the registration 
statement is declared effective.”). 
 45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (prohibiting material misstatements and omissions in 
connection with the sale or offer of securities); id. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for documents 
containing materially false or misleading information); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 
43, at 123–25 (discussing disclosures to investors during road show presentations). 
 46. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is not a 
definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the stock to the public 
until after the preliminary marketing process is complete, some time after a preliminary 
prospectus has been circulated.  SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus 
for an IPO circulated prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently 
stated as a range, at which the stock will be sold.  This price estimate may change in 
subsequent preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires information 
during the marketing process.”). 
 47. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.424(b), 230.430A (2014); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 
43, at 128–29.  Before the promulgation of Rule 430A, the underwriters were required to file 
pricing information in the form of an amendment to the registration statement before the 
SEC declared the registration statement effective. See id.  Under Rule 430A, the registration 
statement can be declared effective before the filing of pricing-related information as long as 
a complete final prospectus is filed shortly thereafter. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A. 
 48. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129. 
 49. For example, counsel typically give formal legal opinions regarding the issuer and 
the stock being issued, as well as interpret legal matters such as tax and litigation 
consequences. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18 (“In addition, company counsel 
normally renders a formal opinion on the legality of the securities being registered, which is 
filed as an exhibit to the registration statement.  In connection with a common stock 
offering, the opinion would state that the shares being offered are legally issued, fully paid, 
and non-assessable.”). 
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possible future performance by working with the accountants to ensure that 
earnings projections and discussions of planned activities are appropriately 
balanced and match the financial statements in the prospectus.50  Counsel 
also play a key role in determining how the information will be presented, 
which in turn influences how clearly the information is conveyed to 
investors and analysts.51  All of these activities require significant input 
from clients and therefore benefit from good working relationships between 
counsel and clients, as well as a good understanding by counsel of what 
clients’ interests are in each stage of the process.  The ultimate product has 
an impact on the performance of the deal, as discussed in the next section. 
2.  The Role of Information in Transactional Outcomes 
In theory, the information product that lawyers work with their clients to 
produce impacts the extent to which investors can accurately assess the risk 
and return profiles of issuing companies, and therefore should impact the 
performance of a company’s stock, at least in the short- and medium-term.  
The theoretical impact of disclosure on price is supported by empirical 
work that has studied the connection between the two.52 
Empirical studies have generally found a connection between rough 
measures of disclosure quality and the market’s reception of an IPO stock.53  
Disclosure quality has been proxied in these studies in terms of volume,54 
proportion of the prospectus,55 and level of ambiguity.56  These studies 
indicate that certain types of disclosure bear significant relationships to 
price performance of the issued securities in the market.  The studies 
indicate that risk factor disclosure—described as a negative or ambiguous 
disclosure—bears a positive association with underpricing.57  In other 
words, risk factor disclosure is related to a large price increase of the stock 
on the first day of trading, which means that the offering price was lower 
than the market uptake of the stock would have predicted, at least in the 
short-term.  By contrast, greater levels of neutral or positive disclosure (i.e., 
 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 18–19. 
 52. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure:  Why Issuer 
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–93 (1999) (surveying 
available empirical studies on the impact of mandatory disclosure). 
 53. See, e.g., Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and 
Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1497, 1497–1500 (2010) [hereinafter Arnold et al., 
Effects of Ambiguous Information]; Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The 
Information Content of IPO Prospectuses, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2821–23 (2010); 
Spindler, supra note 12, at 1–5; Tom Arnold et al., Measuring Risk Disclosure in IPOs and 
Its Effect on Initial and Subsequent Returns (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228419565_Measuring_Risk_Disclosure_in_IPOs_
and_its_Effect_on_Initial_and_Subsequent_Returns [http://perma.cc/7LTY-WSN2]. 
 54. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9. 
 55. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–40; see also Spindler, supra note 12, 
at 9–10 (using ratio of risk factors to prospectus summary as a proxy for overall proportion 
of positive to negative disclosure). 
 56. Arnold et al., Effects of Ambiguous Information, supra note 53, at 1497. 
 57. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9–19. 
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everything outside of the risk factors) have been found to correspond to less 
underpricing.58  More particularly, certain sections of the prospectus 
containing important information, specifically the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MD&A), the Prospectus Summary, and Use of Proceeds 
sections, have been found to correspond to lower levels of underpricing.59  
Taken together, these studies indicate that positive information leads to 
more accurate pricing, while ambiguous or negative information leads to 
less accurate pricing and more money left on the table by the issuing 
company.60  This also results in lower commissions for the underwriter, but 
as explained below, the underwriter may garner benefits from this 
phenomenon that more than offset any loss.  These studies are relevant to 
the lawyers’ role in the transaction and in the securities law scheme more 
generally, because both sets of lawyers provide substantial input into the 
disclosure.  The lawyers produce information for the prospectus and verify 
its content through due diligence, make legal judgments about the extent of 
information necessary to include in the prospectus, review the prospectus 
for accuracy, and negotiate its content with each other and with the SEC via 
rounds of comment and response.  Therefore, to the extent disclosure has an 
impact on material outcomes of the deal, such as price accuracy and 
stability over time, the lawyers’ role in creating the prospectus is 
significant. 
B.  Lawyers and Transaction Costs in IPOs 
Transaction cost engineering involves minimizing transaction costs that 
unnecessarily reduce the value of a financial product, while bearing no 
inherent relationship to the financial product’s expected risk or return.61  
Transaction costs create inefficiencies in the deal making process, causing 
it to become more difficult or costly than it would be if conducted in a 
hypothetical perfect market.62  These costs can arise from numerous 
sources:  time, expense, regulatory costs, bargaining costs, enforcement 
costs, inefficient communication, irrational or strategic behavior, and 
externalities.63  Lack of information, risk, and uncertainty also create 
transaction costs.  With respect to transaction costs, risk, uncertainty, and 
lack of information affect a transaction because they impose costs to 
 
 58. See id. at 16–19. 
 59. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34.  I have located no study that has 
been able to confirm a causal relationship between disclosure and underpricing, and several 
have noted that it may be the result of underlying uncertainty.  As explained below, this 
Article provides previously unavailable evidence of causation through instrumental variable 
regression. 
 60. See id. at 2857–61. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 21–28 
(1995) (describing how transaction costs affect firm size and choices); Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economics of Organization:  The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–
56 (1981) (discussing different types of transaction costs and their effects on asset 
allocation). 
 63. See generally HART, supra note 62; Williamson, supra note 62. 
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overcome them, disable complete contracting or, as often happens, create 
obstacles that can cause a deal to break down even when it should make 
economic sense.64 
Lawyers can minimize transaction costs in a number of ways in addition 
to producing accurate information as described in the preceding section, 
and good working relationships with clients are important to all of them.  
Lawyers may reduce costly inefficiencies by helping parties avoid and 
resolve potentially costly disputes that could needlessly prevent valuable 
deal making.65  Lawyers can contribute to reducing transaction costs by 
helping coordinate the different parties involved and ensuring that all 
parties have a proper understanding of the tasks to be completed at each 
stage of the deal.66  Expertise with respect to the IPO process is important 
for accomplishing this end, but relational skill is perhaps more important 
because it facilitates efficient interactions between the parties.67  This can, 
in turn, facilitate faster deal completion and establish processes that require 
less work on the part of clients, who can then focus their energies on other 
aspects of the deal.  Greater time efficiency can reduce unwanted deal 
delays and allow the underwriter better to control the timing of the deal to 
ensure the best performance. 
Familiarity of the underwriter’s counsel with the underwriter—both 
through relationships with the underwriter’s personnel and through 
knowledge of its institutional practices—might also reduce agency costs.  
Although agency costs are a distinct concept from transaction costs, agency 
costs—stemming from the divergence between information and interests of 
the principal and the agent—can lead to inefficiencies that can be 
categorized as a form of transaction cost as well.  The better a lawyer 
knows his or her client’s preferences, the less time and energy are needed 
for the client to transfer information to the agent, and the lower the 
likelihood that the lawyer will erroneously represent the client’s interest.  
The more familiar the lawyer and the client become, the more trust they 
develop, and the less effort the client has to put forth to monitor the lawyer.  
Moreover, the more familiar a lawyer is with the underwriters’ ideal 
 
 64. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 
1995); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive 
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (explaining how transaction costs lead to 
contract incompleteness, which in turn is a barrier to deal completion); Paul Milgrom & 
John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic 
Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57–89 (James E. Alt & Kenneth 
A. Shepsle eds., 1990). 
 65. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 254; Gilson, supra note 8, at 509.  Professors Gilson and 
Mnookin expand upon this model by explaining that skilled lawyers help their clients by 
negotiating value-creating exchanges, capitalizing on economies of scale and scope, and 
managing inherent tensions between value creation and distribution. See Gilson & Mnookin, 
supra note 8, at 9–12. 
 66. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 19 (describing the importance of coordination 
between the lawyers and other parties and the importance of having a common 
understanding of the deal structure). 
 67. See id. 
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outcomes, the more they would be able to advocate for the underwriters’ 
interests, with less delay and lower danger of miscommunication. 
Finally, a lawyer’s substantive expertise can reduce regulatory costs, a 
subset of transaction costs,68 adding value by advising clients on ways to 
avoid costly government regulations.  This might take the form of avoiding 
direct costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on how to minimize 
taxation.  Or it might involve less direct, but no less significant costs, such 
as when a lawyer advises a client on the most favorable jurisdiction and/or 
form in which to incorporate to reduce legal uncertainty, or avoid 
litigation.69  In the IPO context, counsel may assist in managing regulatory 
costs by advising on the issuer’s legal organization, governance, or capital 
structure prior to the commencement of the deal.70  Counsel also liaise with 
the SEC and other regulators, and the lawyers’ ability to handle issues that 
the regulators bring up can have an impact on the timing and efficiency of 
the deal.71 
C.  Lawyers As Reputational Intermediaries 
Another way to describe the value of transactional lawyers is through 
their role as reputational intermediaries.72  Reputational intermediaries 
convey important information to the market about the quality of a 
transaction.73  This model suggests that lawyers (as well as other 
professionals involved in the deal) add value by providing a signal of 
quality in the underlying transaction.74  This model is not exclusive of the 
 
 68. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500–02 (2006) (reporting the results of a survey in in-house 
legal counsel on the value of transactional lawyers). 
 69. See id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law (Harvard Law 
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper 337, 2002), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=harvard_olin (describing the 
market for corporate law, as evidenced by choices of jurisdiction of incorporation that most 
reduces costs related to legal uncertainty and use of familiar default rules) 
[http://perma.cc/7WPT-QT7Q]. 
 70. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19. 
 71. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the process of dealing with SEC comment and 
deficiency letters). 
 72. See Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century:  
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 17, 46–48 (2003); see also Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 
74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995) (proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational 
intermediaries).  The impact of lawyer expertise has been examined in the mergers and 
acquisitions context. See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and 
Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189–99 (2013). 
 73. See generally Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial 
Public Offerings, 64 ACCT. REV. 693 (1989); Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12; Richard Carter 
& Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 
1053 (1990); Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-
Run Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285–290 (1998). 
 74. See Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial 
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 596 (1996); see also Okamato, supra note 72, at 18 
(“The suggestion here is that service as a reputational intermediary is a defining aspect of 
lawyers’ work.”). 
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“transaction costs engineers” model; in fact, a lawyer’s reputation may 
itself derive from the ability to reduce transaction costs in the way that 
Gilson and others describe.  Nonetheless, the reputational intermediary 
model encompasses more than the lawyer’s substantive ability to reduce 
frictions by applying legal or negotiation skill.  The model includes the 
possibility that because of reputational concerns, lawyers will screen 
transactions before agreeing to take on the work, and therefore the mere 
fact of a lawyer’s participation in a deal is a signal of quality.75 
In the context of IPOs specifically, theories have been advanced that the 
reputation of the underwriter,76 auditor,77 and underwriter’s counsel78 
might all convey information to investors beyond what is contained in the 
prospectus and affect the price of the IPO stock.  Empirical tests of these 
theories have demonstrated a relationship between lead underwriter 
reputation and lower levels of underpricing, indicating more accurate 
pricing of the offering.79  This has been explained as a function of the 
incentives of high reputation underwriters in preserving their reputations 
through more accurate pricing.  A similar relationship has been 
demonstrated with regard to auditors.80  However, studies of lawyers’ 
reputations have had mixed results:  one study found a negative relationship 
between market share of legal counsel and IPO underpricing generally, 
although the trend reversed with respect to large New York law firms.81  
Other studies have found that lawyers’ reputations, when measured by 
market share, do not impact price.82  This makes sense to the extent that the 
identity of the lawyers rarely plays a role in investors’ decision making.83  
However, as explained further in subsequent sections, the reputation of 
legal counsel alone is unlikely to play a large role in the performance of 
IPO deals. 
D.  Repeated Interaction and Selection of Counsel 
Apart from lawyer reputation, lawyers’ ability to add value in the ways 
just described might all be affected by their familiarity with the clients 
whom they represent.  Even reputation, though not directly impacted by 
 
 75. See id. 
 76. See e.g., Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12, at 213; Carter et al., supra note 73, at 285. 
 77. See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 73, at 693. 
 78. See, e.g., Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 166. 
 79. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2853–55. But see Patch Paczkowski & 
Majdi Anwar Quttainah, Law Firm Prestige As a Signal of Value for Initial Public Offerings 
(June 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2087695 
[http://perma.cc/T2QJ-SQ6Y].  For further discussion of this theory, see generally Franklin 
Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN. 
ECON. 303 (1989). 
 80. See generally Beatty, supra note 73. 
 81. See Royce de R. Barondes & Gary C. Sanger, Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing 
16–21 (May 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=227729 [http://perma.cc/6PF2-XNP8]. 
 82. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 575–95. 
 83. Telephone Interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
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familiarity with clients, might be related to lawyers’ ability to cultivate and 
maintain client relationships.  One way to assess whether good working 
relationships have any impact on deals is to look at the repeated interactions 
between lawyers and clients.  Repeated interactions provide a useful proxy 
for better lawyer-client relationships because they build familiarity and 
trust, establish common understanding, and facilitate communication.84 
As previously noted, my research has not revealed other studies of the 
impact of lawyers’ relational skill in the transactional setting.  However, 
empirical studies of lawyer relationships in other contexts shed some light 
on what results might be expected, and a number of instructive studies have 
looked at lawyers as repeat players.  One noteworthy study demonstrated 
that iterative relations significantly promote collaboration between lawyers 
on opposite sides of a case in the litigation context.85  Another empirical 
study tested repeated interactions among litigators and concluded that 
frequent contact helps lawyers to learn about each other’s strategies, build 
relationships, and foster concern for reputation.86  The study concluded that 
repeated interactions increase cooperation between lawyers negotiating a 
settlement, as the different sides learn how best to deal with each other.87  It 
is possible that the dynamics at work for repeated meetings among litigators 
would hold true for repeated meetings between lawyers and clients in the 
transactional setting as well. 
The empirical literature on teams adds support to the hypothesis that 
repeated interaction fosters trust and better teamwork.  A number of studies 
provide evidence that frequent interaction leads to the creation of group 
norms, shared understanding of the tasks to be completed, and routinized 
processes.88  These processes further allow each member of the team to 
leverage individual expertise more effectively and in concert with other 
team members.  Experimental evidence suggests that when team members 
are replaced by newer members of a team, some of these gains are lost as 
the team and the new member adjust to a new group dynamic.89  This 
 
 84. See Steve W. J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work 
Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006). 
 85. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 534–64 (discussing the impact of iterative 
interactions on litigators); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 340–45. 
 86. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?  
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 46, 59–60 (2002). 
 87. See id. at 40–48 (outlining mechanisms by which better results are obtained through 
repeated interactions); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–50 (stating game-
theoretic bases for increased cooperation over time). 
 88. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“[R]epeated interactions among 
individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such that shared 
structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process interactions.  Process 
begets structure, which in turn guides process.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 
17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a common understanding of the 
tasks to be accomplished). 
 89. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86.  In one interesting experiment, teams 
were assembled to create origami birds.  Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task 
together multiple times, but lost efficiency when members of the existing team were 
replaced with new members. See id. 
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further suggests that frequent collaboration engenders benefits to a group 
endeavor that cannot be easily replicated in the absence of such familiarity. 
Empirical studies of the relationships between lawyers and their clients 
suggest that clients value familiarity.90  Large corporate clients such as 
investment banks frequently choose from among a panel of lawyers, all of 
whom are of high quality.91  But recent empirical work indicates that 
selection of counsel is based on more than quality of counsel and fee 
structure as traditionally assumed; relationships with lawyers and teams of 
lawyers within each firm exert a strong influence on which law firms are 
selected to act for a client.92  Similarly, lawyers in the equity capital 
markets space emphasize the importance of interpersonal relationships with 
clients as a major factor that helps them to get repeat business.93  Thus, 
there are indications that familiarity and relationships are valuable to clients 
as well as lawyers. 
Nonetheless, familiarity and repeated interaction might not necessarily 
lead to measurably better outcomes.  First, even if there are intangible 
benefits from familiarity, they may not translate into any quantifiable 
results in terms of deal performance.  The various individuals who are party 
to the deal might enjoy the experience more, and feel it is more efficient, 
but this may or may not translate into, for example, better disclosure, better 
marketing, or better price performance.  Second, familiarity does not 
necessarily lead to better quality of interaction in every instance.  Some 
research suggests that working together repeatedly may not lead to better 
collaboration if team processes are not well thought out.94  Moreover, it is 
not difficult to imagine that familiarity might make counsel less able to be 
objective, either for fear of offending the client or from loss of perspective 
after spending too much time taking the client’s point of view.  
Alternatively, familiarity might cause lawyers to take the relationship for 
granted and therefore devote fewer resources to the client.  In the same 
vein, interpersonal considerations or overreliance might make it difficult for 
a client to fire its counsel, thus allowing counsel to shirk.  I turn now to a 
discussion of the data to explain which way it cuts. 
 
 90. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1003. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See id. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human 
Capitalists:  An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split 
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 357–68 (1985) (advancing a model of lawyer selection based 
on relationship to a firm and firm-specific capital rather than interpersonal relationships 
among individuals). 
 93. Some banks have preferred firms.  For example, Morgan Stanley is known to work 
with Davis Polk & Wardell regularly on equity capital markets deals.  Similarly, Goldman 
Sachs is known to work frequently with Sullivan & Cromwell.  Several of the lawyers in 
these firms have such close relationships with bank personnel that they participate in 
business related decisions, and their capital markets partners become involved in the 
marketing side of IPOs. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name 
withheld by request) (on file with author). 
 94. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50. 
150 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
II.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The empirical analysis and its implications are set out below.  This part 
begins by describing the qualitative and quantitative data in detail and 
walks through the quantitative analysis.  The part discusses how the 
quantitative data can be interpreted and how the findings illuminate (or fail 
to illuminate) the questions raised in the previous part.  This part also 
discusses some important caveats and potential weaknesses of the analysis 
and discusses why the data are informative despite those weaknesses.    
A.  Repeated Interactions and IPO Deal Outcomes 
In this section, I describe the data and empirical analysis that support the 
implications of the theoretical discussion above.  First, I describe the 
impressions of team dynamics taken from interviews with practicing 
lawyers.  I then explain the quantitative analysis, drawing from an original 
dataset of IPOs and examining the repeated interactions between banks and 
law firms that handle the transactions. 
1.  Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics 
Practitioner accounts are useful for understanding how lawyers and their 
clients perceive the impact of team dynamics on deals outcomes.  The 
lawyers interviewed for this study routinely listed familiarity and trust as 
key hallmarks of IPO deals that they experience as successful.  Often they 
cite past experience working with their clients as an important precursor for 
familiarity and trust.95  Moreover, better deals result when all the parties 
working on the deal seem to have a common vision of how the deal should 
be done.96  While there are certain similarities between deals, each 
underwriter leading a deal has idiosyncratic institutional priorities, and the 
people within the underwriting banks have their own preferences.97  
Lawyers frequently report that understanding those preferences from the 
outset of the deal helps to facilitate the entire process.98  The lawyers on the 
deal come to understand their client organizations’ operations,99 including 
the key personnel to contact to accomplish the range of tasks necessary to 
move the deal along.100  In addition, lawyers develop an understanding of 
the communication norms inside an investment bank,101 as well as the 
 
 95. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) 
(on file with author). 
 96. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
 97. See id. 
 98. There was a consensus among lawyer interviews that this was the case. See, e.g., 
Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on file with 
author). 
 99. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author).  As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “It gets easier 
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institutional preferences with regard to how to negotiate the deal.102  This 
understanding of how the client operates supplements an enhanced 
understanding of the client’s institutional interests, as well as the 
preferences of individuals in the client organization.103  The result, in 
theory, is better coordination of agents with their principals in the 
performance of their tasks.  In addition, information disparities are less a 
source of agency costs because the lawyer-agent has less need to spend time 
gathering information about the client’s interests and can negotiate more 
forcefully on the client’s behalf. 
Further, when lawyers and clients work together frequently, they develop 
greater mutual trust, assuming previous deals have gone well.  Trust allows 
clients to feel less need to monitor their lawyer-agents, freeing the client to 
focus on marketing and other commercial aspects of the deal.104  Indeed, 
some lawyer-client relationships involve such a high degree of trust and 
familiarity that lawyers become involved in helping their clients to think 
through business strategy in addition to providing legal advice.105  The 
overall impression is that frequent collaboration leads to trust, that each 
member of the deal team can focus on his or her job better, and that the 
team produces better work, more quickly. 
If familiarity creates trust and efficiency, lack of familiarity can create 
the opposite.  When describing deals that did not go well, lawyers recall 
working with other counsel who do not seem to know the norms of how 
deals should be done.106  These deals typically involve issuer’s counsel that 
either lack experience in IPOs, or resolutely refuse to trust underwriters.  In 
such situations, there is often a lack of trust and an adversarial attitude 
toward the underwriter and its counsel.  In such cases, lawyers for issuing 
companies reportedly fight over issues that most seasoned participants in 
IPO deals would think are unimportant, and when the issuing company’s 
management makes unreasonable demands, the issuer’s lawyers refuse to 
counsel their clients on commonly accepted industry practices.107 
 
the more times you work together.  I know exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something.  
Or who to prod if something needs to get done.” Id. 
 102. Telephone Interview with Attorney 2 (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on 
file with author). 
 103. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.  For example, one 
in-house lawyer taking his company public recounts that during negotiations, the 
underwriter’s counsel, who worked frequently with the underwriters on such deals, regularly 
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not agree to, without any need to 
confer with anyone from the bank’s team. See Interview with Attorney (June 19, 2013) 
(name withheld by request) (on file with author). 
 104. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013), supra note 99 (recounting that 
some partners in some law firms understand their industry so well that they actually are able 
to advise on the help with the commercial side of the a capital markets deal). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
 107. See id.  Experienced attorneys are reportedly better able to counsel issuing company 
management against making exaggerated statements or falling out of step with standard 
practices. See also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14. 
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On the client side, personnel in investment banks who work with lawyers 
describe poor deals as those in which the lawyers do not seem to know what 
they are doing and in which the bankers have to explain every step.  The 
deals are marked by a lack of trust in the bank’s counsel and the need to 
recheck and sometimes redo work that the lawyers have done.108 
2.  Quantitative Analysis 
The basis for the quantitative analysis below is the observation that 
lawyers working on IPOs frequently represent the same underwriter and the 
same teams within an underwriting bank.  Moreover, lawyers representing 
underwriters will often meet the same sets of counsel representing issuers 
from deal to deal.109  While it is difficult to observe interpersonal 
interactions with enough regularity to assess their systematic impacts, a 
meaningful proxy of these interactions is the frequency with which an 
investment bank managing a deal and the lawyers serving as the bank’s 
counsel work together.110  Although I do not observe the individuals inside 
the investment banks themselves, it is reasonable to infer that many of the 
same individuals would be involved in deals done within a short time frame 
if the deals are done out of the same office, in the same location, and within 
a particular industry.  Accounting for those factors, the membership of the 
teams within banks and firms reportedly remains stable over relatively short 
periods of time.111 
I examine repeated interactions by looking at the number of IPO deals 
completed in the preceding one year, two years, and three years involving:  
(1) the same underwriter’s counsel and lead underwriter(s) and (2) the same 
sets of counsel.  In theory, if repeated interaction improves relationships 
between a lawyer and his or her client, it might have positive benefits for a 
lawyer’s effectiveness, coordination, and communication in furtherance of 
the client’s interests.  In addition, relationships across the table can help to 
facilitate the deal.  With respect to uncertainty and risk, better coordination 
could help produce more complete and easily digested disclosure, thus 
reducing uncertainty in the market and allowing investors to confidently 
calculate risk.  Coordination might help in this regard because both sets of 
lawyers and the underwriter would have a shared understanding of the type 
 
 108. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2014), supra note 99. 
 109. Between 1996 and 2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across 
the table from one another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2265 
total deals.  Between 1996 and 2010, there were also 406 instances in which issuer’s counsel 
had acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previous year.  On 
206 of those occasions, the issuer’s counsel also had worked across the table from the lead 
underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total of 2265 deals.  Between those 
same years, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that had worked across the table from one 
another in an IPO deal at least three times within the preceding two years. 
 110. As an additional robustness check, names of individual attorneys for each deal were 
collected and matched to each transaction.  The result shows a significant effect, with a 
stronger magnitude.  These results, as well as others, will be reported in a future study. 
 111. This was corroborated by interviews. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney 
(Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. 
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of information to unearth in the due diligence process and how best to 
present it in the prospectus to tell the appropriate story to the market.112  
This would in turn translate into more accurate pricing and better 
performance in the market.  Stronger market performance, coupled with 
better disclosure, should produce less IPO-related litigation, all else being 
equal. 
B.  Analysis of the Data 
The following discussion explains the quantitative analysis and result of 
this study in detail.  The data analyzed below comes from a number of 
public sources.  The starting point for data collection on IPOs in the United 
States is the Kenney-Patton IPO Database.113  This dataset contains 
information for 2287 de novo IPOs between 1996 and 2010.114  Each IPO 
was cross-checked with the Thompson ONE deal record to confirm the 
date, ticker, and issuer name.115  From the Thompson ONE database I also 
pull information on the underwriting syndicate, including the names of the 
bookrunners or joint bookrunners, managers’ and issuer’s counsel, and the 
age of the issuing company.  The dealsheet also includes the initial price 
range filed with the SEC as well as the stock opening price, which I use to 
determine whether the opening price was revised up or down from the 
initial range.  To find measures of each stock’s performance over time, I 
use information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database.116  In particular, I look at the opening day closing price relative to 
the offer price; the price change at thirty, sixty, and ninety days and one 
year; and the volatility over thirty, sixty, and ninety days.  In addition, from 
the SEC’s EDGAR database, I gather the offering prospectuses from each 
IPO and cull from these the total word counts, as well as the word counts 
for each section of the prospectus including the prospectus summary, the 
risk factors, and the management’s discussion and analysis section.117  The 
word counts disregard information contained in tables and charts.  This 
methodology is used in other research on IPOs on the rationale that pure 
word counts, while constituting a very rough estimate of the types of 
 
 112. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the importance of close 
coordination among members of the deal team). 
 113. For more information on the database, see MARTIN KENNEY & DONALD PATTON, 
U.C. DAVIS, GUIDE TO THE FIRM DATABASE OF EMERGING GROWTH INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS (IPOS) FROM 1990 THROUGH 2010 (2013), http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/faculty/ 
webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/PRE8-G25G]. 
 114. The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of preferred 
stock, and spin-offs. 
 115. THOMPSON ONE DATABASE, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/tools-
applications/trading-investment-tools/thomson-one-investment-research-
tools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiAx4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt
6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9oMbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
[http://perma.cc/VU27-UJ3K]. 
 116. CRSP U.S. STOCK DATABASES, http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/ 
crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/54TD-Q9CJ]. 
 117. U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/BGN2-LBMJ]. 
154 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
disclosure included, do not suffer from the potential bias associated with 
hand-coded disclosure elements.118  Information on class action litigation 
was taken from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.119 
Twenty-two records were dropped because information could not be 
found on the issue in the Thompson ONE database or because the CRSP 
database did not contain information on the share price.  The resulting 
dataset has 2265 IPOs spanning fifteen years.  The identities of each IPO’s 
managing underwriter or underwriters are taken from this data set.  A bank 
is considered a managing underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a 
joint bookrunner.120   The identities of the underwriter’s counsel and 
issuer’s counsel are similarly determined from this data.121 
The offer date is used to construct variables of how often a certain 
underwriter-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together in the 
previous one year, two years, and three years for each new issue.  For 
example, Goldman Sachs was a manager of Goodman Global’s IPO on 
April 5, 2006, and their counsel was Cahill Gordon & Reindel.  This was 
the third time the pair had worked together in a year, as they had also 
worked together on Horizon Lines Inc.’s September 26, 2005 IPO and New 
Skies Satellites May 9, 2005 IPO.  Prior to that, they had not worked 
together since they teamed up for Equinix, Inc.’s August 10, 2000 IPO.  
Time periods beyond three years are not examined given the likelihood of 
lower rates of overlap between teams working together on transactions after 
such long time periods. 
With respect to the recurring deal in which the same counsel represents 
an underwriter, or in which the same law firms meet on opposite sides of 
the deal, I analyze a number of quantifiable deal outcomes:  price 
performance, the incidence of price correction before offering date, the 
incidence of litigation, the length of time to complete a transaction, and the 
occurrence of non-integer pricing (as a signal of a more heavily negotiated 
price).  These performance measures are readily quantifiable and offer 
 
 118. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9 (noting the this method “has the advantage of being 
objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of particular disclosures (such as 
coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and does not require subjective index 
weighting”).  Word counts for my study were taken for a total of 2258 prospectuses.  A 
small number (seven) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the 
database. 
 119. STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu 
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/XK24-VTNU]. 
 120. The most frequent lead underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154), 
Morgan Stanley (137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122).  Bank mergers are 
treated as the “death” of each of the merging banks and the “birth” of the merged bank.  To 
give an illustrative example, “Credit Suisse,” “First Boston,” and “Credit Suisse First 
Boston” are treated as three different firms. 
 121. The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (176), 
Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath, Swaine & Moore (111), 
and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106).  As with investment banks, law firm 
mergers are treated as the death of each old firm and the birth of a new firm.  In the rare 
cases of multiple firms representing management, the two firms are treated as a single unit 
for that transaction. 
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strong indications of how well the parties to the deal have performed once 
other relevant factors are controlled for. 
With respect to price performance, for purposes of investigating the 
extent to which frequency of interaction matters, I employ Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression analysis122 using the stock price increase during 
the first day of trading (Appendix Table 1) and the price change after thirty, 
sixty, and ninety days of trading, relative to the performance of the S&P 
Index to account for the effect of market movements (Appendix Table 2).  
With respect to the probability of price correction (Appendix Table 3) as 
well as class action litigation (Appendix Table 4), I employ a probit 
regression analysis.123  For upward price revision, I estimate the change in 
probability that the parties to the deal will correctly raise the offering price 
from the top of the initial filing range for deals that perform well in the 
market.  With respect to litigation, I estimate the change in probability that 
a securities class action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months and the 
first year after the IPO offer date. 
In addition to these variables, I use a number of other independent 
variables to ensure a generalizable result, in line with prior empirical 
literature on IPOs.124  These variables include:  (1) dummy variables for the 
IPO year, (2) the industry category of the issuer (as determined according to 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code) to control for different 
market conditions over time and in various industries, (3) each investment 
bank in order to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with 
each lead underwriter, as well as (4) the interaction of these variables. 
(Appendix Figure A).125  In addition, for all specifications, I control for the 
IPO size measured in terms of the gross proceeds of the offering, a variable 
frequently used as a proxy for deal quality.126 
 
 122. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to find a function that approximately fits a 
set of data; i.e., it attempts to determine the relationship between a set of explanatory 
variables and an outcome variable of interest. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC 
ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (MIT Press 2010). 
 123. A probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only 
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probability of an event occurring, versus the 
probability of the event not occurring. See id. at 566–67. 
 124. See e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; see also Eckbo et al., supra 
note 7, at 276–79. 
 125. Dummy variables provide a method of controlling for variation within certain 
categories of variables by removing the mean of the observations for the dependent variable 
of interest.  For example, in an OLS regression using first day price jump (i.e., underpricing) 
as the dependent variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used.  This allows for 
variation in overall underpricing from year to year, by removing the mean underpricing for 
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that particular 
year.  So if, for example, 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large amount of 
underpricing, the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average underpricing and 
leave only the variation attributable to other factors.  The same is done for each IPO quarter, 
each lead underwriter, each industry, and the interaction of each industry and year. See 
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 307–10. 
 126. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; Eckbo et al., supra note 7, at 276–
79.  Regressions use the natural log of gross proceeds to mitigate skewness in the 
distribution of dollar amounts. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33.  In 
the alternative specifications in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, I also use the size of the company 
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I perform each analysis using a number of alternative specifications to 
test the robustness of the model.  Appendix Tables 7 and 8 report the results 
for analysis of the first day price increase and the probability of litigation 
under the alternative specifications. 
C.  Main Results 
This section illustrates some of the basic relationships in the raw data.  
The figures below show that repeated bank-lawyer interactions in the past 
year are associated with a greater opening day price jump, as well as greater 
price performance after the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days 
(relative to the S&P 500 Index). 
 
Figure 2:  Repeated Interactions and Price Performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(measured by total assets) and the book value per share as alternatives ways to control for 
deal quality.  Regressions using total assets yield coefficients similar to those using the log 
of gross proceeds, indicating that the latter is a good proxy for the size of the issuing 
company. 
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 These graphs show that issues where the lead underwriting bank and 
counsel have worked together repeatedly tend to exhibit superior price 
performance (as well as underpricing) at incrementally higher levels.  Of 
course, this is merely descriptive, and there are many confounds that also 
affect these performance measures.  To attempt to investigate if this 
relationship is real, I turn to OLS regression analysis controlling for factors 
that influence market performance. 
1.  Price Performance Regression Analysis 
The first performance measure analyzed is the opening day price jump.  
Panel A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a strong and 
significant effect from increased bank-counsel interactions, even after 
controlling very flexibly for year, industry, and bank fixed effects. 
The first two specifications look at the number of bank-counsel 
interactions within a year of the IPO, with and without bank fixed effects.  
The subsequent columns look at the number of interactions in the preceding 
two and three year periods.  In all cases, the marginal effect of an additional 
interaction is positive and statistically significant.  There are two notable 
trends across these specifications:  the value of a marginal interaction 
decreases as the time horizon increases, and the effect survives the 
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introduction of bank fixed effects to control for quality concerns or bank 
idiosyncrasies. 
The next set of performance measures to be examined is the percentage 
price change over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to 
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of days to control 
for the effect of overall market returns.  The controls in all cases are 
dummies for the IPO year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those 
two sets.127  Robust standard errors are used for each regression.128 
Panel A of Appendix Table 2 shows the results for the thirty, sixty, and 
ninety-day price performance measures.  Deals involving frequent 
collaborators are associated with strong market performance over the first 
ninety days, as measured by price relative to the S&P 500 Index.  The effect 
of each additional interaction on the relative change in a stock’s price 
relative to the S&P Index after thirty trading days is 4.4 percent when the 
lawyer-underwriter collaborations occur within the past year.  The marginal 
performance price increase drops to 2.8 percent when the lawyer-bank 
collaborations are spread over the past three years.  Correspondingly, fewer 
recent interactions between a bank and a law firm are strongly associated 
with lower price performance over the same periods.  The effect remains 
for the first ninety days of trading, for which each deal in the past year is 
associated with a 7.5 percent increase, declining to a 4.1 percent increase in 
relative price for deals within the preceding three years. 
From the regression analysis, it appears that frequency of interaction 
bears a strong positive correlation with stock performance.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that teams of lawyers and bankers working 
together repeatedly and over a short period of time are able to improve deal 
outcomes, leading to a positive impact on the price of a stock.  However, 
these outcomes may also indicate overly high levels of underpricing, 
especially because the price increase is sustained over the long term.  In 
addition, selection is a particular concern with respect to the underwriter 
and its counsel because managing underwriters might be likely to pick the 
same law firms repeatedly to do the best performing deals.  In order to rule 
out selection and tease apart positive relational impacts from negative ones, 
I perform further tests below. 
2.  Selection 
A concern with respect to interactions between the underwriters and their 
counsel is the possibility that the results above are selection driven.  After 
all, underwriters select their counsel, and we might be concerned that their 
selection criteria are related somehow to the outcomes analyzed above.  If 
 
 127. Additional controls such as the syndicate size were not significant and so were not 
reported. 
 128. To eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to industry, bank, and year, 
each regression was run using clustered standard errors on those dimensions with no change 
in the significance of the results. See A. Colin Cameron et al., Robust Inference with 
Multiway Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238, 238–49 (2011). 
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that is the case, then the underwriter’s selection of counsel could be tied to 
the quality of the issuer and the quality of the transaction as a whole, and 
metrics such as price performance might simply be a result of the same 
underlying considerations that led to the appointment of a particular law 
firm.  Therefore, the quality of the deal drives both the result and the 
selection of counsel.  For instance, if Goldman Sachs wins the lead 
underwriting spot in a “hot” IPO, it may select its most preferred counsel, 
Sullivan & Cromwell, to act as counsel on the deal, and because the deal is 
“hot,” it may generate better market performance and/or more underpricing. 
The most compelling argument against this possible selection story is 
that the underwriter selects its counsel before due diligence takes place and 
before the bookbuilding process begins, meaning that the worrisome early 
selection takes place well before the bank is in a position to know how a 
particular issue will perform in the market.  One might nonetheless observe 
that an underwriter can have a good sense of what sort of price performance 
an issue will yield in advance of the bookbuilding itself—after all, the 
underwriter has to come up with a proposed price range when making its 
pitch to the issuer in the first place. 
Even taking this fact into account, however, the incremental nature of the 
results (i.e., that each additional interaction is associated with an 
incremental increase in price performance on average) makes the selection 
story above unlikely.  That is the case because in order for selection to be 
driving the results, it would have to be true that lead underwriters can 
accurately and systematically predict the level of underpricing and market 
price performance (as well as time to completion and litigation outcomes as 
further discussed below) and choose different legal counsel a specific 
number of times based on the precise predictions for each deal.  That 
scenario is extremely unlikely.129 
Nonetheless, further analysis of the data is useful to provide evidence 
that selection is unlikely to be driving the observed effects.  I do this by 
cutting the data to isolate observations that might plausibly be the product 
of selection.  As previously described, the most obvious selection story is 
that investment banks managing high performing IPOs are more likely to 
choose particular counsel repeatedly.  If this were the case, it would also 
produce a pattern in which repeated bank-counsel interactions are 
associated with incrementally better market performance, as seen above.  
To determine whether this selection story is supported by the data, I 
observe that a relatively small group of investment banks typically leads the 
“hot” IPOs.  The banks that tend to get these deals are the ones that have 
the greatest amount of IPO experience.130  I continue by limiting the sample 
to those banks, creating smaller subgroups consisting of those banks that 
serve as lead underwriter in at least forty issues in the dataset (the top 
 
 129. See, e.g., Telephone interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by 
request) (on file with author). 
 130. See id.  In addition, prior to entering academia, I spent several years as an associate 
in the capital markets department of a major international law firm, where I worked on IPOs 
as well as other types of transactions. 
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eighteen banks) and to those that manage at least eighty issues in the dataset 
(the top seven banks).131  If the main results are selection driven, they 
should disappear in the limited samples, because those samples contain 
most of the “hot” IPOs, and any significant variation due to the quality of 
the underwriter or the quality of the deal should flatten out.  But as 
Appendix Table 9 shows, the results remain even in these limited samples.  
I conduct the same analysis using dollar market share in the year preceding 
any given deal as a measure of bank quality, instead of the number of deals 
in the dataset, and the results remain.  To further rule out the possible 
impact of selection, I perform the same regressions after removing all deals 
in which the bank employs its “favorite” law firms.  I determine a bank’s 
“favorite” law firms in two different ways.  First, I remove the deals 
involving law firms with which banks have done the greatest number of 
deals within the preceding one, two, and three years.  Second, I remove 
deals involving lawyer-underwriter pairs that are reported in interviews to 
be favored lawyer-client relationships in equity capital markets.  If selection 
is driving the main results, and banks are simply picking their favored law 
firms for the best deals, then the results should disappear when the deals 
involving favored law firms are removed.  However, the results remain.  
Finally, I create a variable for the experience level of each law firm to see if 
selection based on expertise might be driving the results.  The results 
remain when controlling for IPO experience of each firm.  Moreover, when 
the number of deals a firm has done in the past over the last one, two, and 
three years is used as the dependent variable in regressions, instead of the 
interactions between firms and investment banks, the effect does disappear.  
This further indicates that the interaction between lawyers and their clients 
impacts the deal beyond the lawyers’ experience alone.  These results, 
along with other robustness checks, are reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 
8. 
3.  Performance Versus Excessive Underpricing 
Another issue which complicates the interpretation of the data is that first 
day price performance, or underpricing, has both good and bad 
interpretations for deal quality.  A very large opening day bounce can be 
viewed not as an indicator of better stock performance, but rather as 
evidence of pricing error on the part of underwriter and poor service 
provided to the issuing company.132  However, as previously discussed, an 
IPO can be considered a success for an underwriter even where 
 
 131. I note that the proxy used here for quality is different than that used in some other 
studies. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34 (using dollar market share for the 
previous year as a measure of underwriter quality).  However, for present purposes, the 
number of deals works as well or better than other measures because it more directly relates 
to the potential selection problem inherent in repeated interactions with counsel.  
Nonetheless, as a test for robustness, I tested the more commonly employed measure of 
quality (dollar market share for the preceding year).  The results remained. 
 132. See generally Alexander, supra note 12 (discussing a theory of underpricing as an 
artifact of error, combined with abundance of caution). 
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underpricing is high, because underwriters are able to capture value through 
trading commissions on the IPO stock (the trading of which tends to 
increase the more underpriced the stock is), as well as quid pro quo 
business from favored investors who receive allocations of the underpriced 
stock and profit from the rise in its price.133  In order to better understand 
how to interpret first day price increase and the effect of repeated 
interactions, it is necessary to parse the underpricing puzzle more finely. 
Understanding the implications of underpricing for the relationship 
between the underwriter and its counsel requires a brief detour into the vast 
economic literature on underpricing.  Numerous theoretical explanations for 
underpricing have been advanced, and a few that are especially relevant to 
the analysis here are worth noting.134  One such explanation is that the 
underpricing serves as a compensation mechanism for investment banks’ 
favored institutional clients, who often bear risk by agreeing to purchase 
shares in IPO issuers.135  The banks need these investors to ensure adequate 
demand for stock in certain offerings, including offerings in which the risk 
of return is uncertain.  Banks compensate these clients for agreeing to 
purchase such stock (and thus ensure adequate demand for the offering) by 
giving an essentially guaranteed margin of return through the underpricing.  
Another possible explanation is that underpricing is a form of insurance 
against the risk of liability, as a stock that performs well relative to its offer 
price is much less frequently the subject of litigation than those which 
perform poorly.136  Regardless of the explanation, the phenomenon is 
generally seen as a transfer of value from the issuing company, which 
receives a lower price for the stock than it otherwise could, to the initial 
investors (and indirectly the investment banks), who realize the gain.  Thus, 
while underpricing might be necessary, the issuer would seek to keep it at a 
minimum, where the underwriter would seek to maximize it in the pricing 
negotiation. 
Most relevantly, various studies have investigated whether different 
attributes of the major players in the IPO process are related to the level of 
underpricing.  A number of studies have found an association between 
 
 133. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 591–92. 
 134. Most of the theoretical explanations come from finance literature. See generally 
James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith III, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification 
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986); Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15 
J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986); Seha M. Tiniç, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common 
Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988).  However, the legal literature has addressed the issue as well. 
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 17–22; Yoram Barzel et al., Prevention Is Better than 
Cure:  The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition, 79 J. BUS. 2911, 
2911–13 (2006); Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 16–21; Richard A. Booth, Going 
Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 649–51 
(2007); Spindler, supra note 12, at 15–16. 
 135. See generally Murat M. Binay et al., The Role of Underwriter-Investor Relationships 
in the IPO Process, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 785 (2007). 
 136. See Tiniç, supra note 134, at 789–95, 803–15 (explaining the liability theory and 
testing it empirically). 
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greater underwriter reputation and lower levels of underpricing.137  At the 
same time, one prominent study found the opposite to be true, particularly 
in offerings of smaller issuers.138  Another set of studies examined IPO 
auditors, finding that greater auditor reputation and level of compensation 
were strongly associated with lower levels of underpricing.139  Of those, a 
few have looked at the relationship of counsel in the deal and the existence 
and/or degree of underpricing. 
Studies of the relationship between legal counsel and underpricing have 
presented a mixed picture.  One study examined the relationship of the 
issuer’s counsel’s reputation, measured by level of compensation, and 
found a correlation between counsel with a good reputation and lower 
levels of underpricing.140  The explanation for this is thought to be either 
that better counsel help the issuer to be more aggressive in its negotiations 
and advocate for more positive disclosure in the prospectus, or that they 
provide quality assurance to the underwriters, or both.141  Another study 
examined the impact on underpricing of the experience level of 
underwriter’s counsel, using a law firm’s market share within its particular 
geographic area to determine experience level.142  This study found a strong 
negative correlation between the experience level of the manager’s counsel 
and the level of upward price adjustment from the initial offering range.  
Those authors theorize that this effect is the result of more experienced 
counsel’s ability to require more negative disclosure about an issuer in the 
preliminary and final prospectus, because this disclosure is the primary 
basis for the bank’s marketing efforts, which in turn affects the final 
price.143  These authors cite previous studies showing upward price 
adjustment as correlated with underpricing to conclude that high-experience 
law firms help to create less underpricing.144 
In order to separate what might be considered positive implications of 
underpricing from negative ones, as well as to isolate the impact of 
familiarity among the parties, it is necessary to analyze (1) what elements 
of the first day bounce data would be consistent with a deal that performs 
well and inconsistent with pricing error or agency problems between the 
underwriter and issuer, and (2) whether either of the above can be explained 
by experience or quality of the lawyers or underwriters, as opposed to 
 
 137. See, e.g., Carter & Manaster, supra note 73, at 1046; Barondes & Sanger, supra note 
81, at 16–21. 
 138. See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 12, at 11–12, 30–31. 
 139. See Beatty, supra note 73, at 693–709; Randolph P. Beatty, The Economic 
Determinants of Auditor Compensation in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 31 J. ACCT. 
RES. 294, 294–300 (1993). 
 140. Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 561, 596.  For a study on the relationship between 
IPO market share by bank and announcement of an investigation by the SEC, see generally 
Beatty et al., The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters, 50 J. 
FIN. ECON. 151 (1998). 
 141. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 595–97. 
 142. See Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 2–3, 19–21. 
 143. See id. 
 144. See id.; see also Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public 
Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231–36 (1993). 
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factors related to the interactions between the lawyers and bankers.  The 
following sections perform this analysis, revealing both inconsistencies 
with the underpricing explanation and strong indications of a well-
performing deal. 
a.  Upward Price Revision 
To test whether the first day bounce is more consistent with good 
performance versus error or lack of independence, I look at the propensity 
for accurate upward price revision between the initial offer range and the 
offer price in the presence of high levels of underpricing, when lawyers and 
managing underwriters have worked together more frequently.  A greater 
propensity for correct price revision linked to counsel’s interaction with the 
underwriter would indicate lower error rates, and possibly greater 
independence on the part of counsel, because the underwriter typically 
prefers to keep the price down and benefits less from revising up.145 
To examine this, I first construct two measures of strong performers, or 
companies whose stock price after thirty trading days is at least 20 percent 
and 30 percent higher, respectively, than the midpoint of their filing price 
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during the same 
thirty days).  The reason for doing this is to find issuances that clearly 
exceed the level of underpricing for new issues that would be intended and 
advertised by a typical underwriter (usually 15 to 20 percent) and therefore 
should presumably have had an upward price revision if the price is to 
remain at 15 to 20 percent below the “correct” level.  I then calculate the 
probability of an upward price revision occurring before the deal closes for 
those deals in which the bank and counsel have worked together frequently 
and for those deals in which the bank and counsel have not worked together 
frequently.  For this analysis, banks and counsel are considered to have 
worked together frequently if they have worked together at least three times 
in the preceding two years.  If the first day bounce associated with repeated 
interactions is the result of greater error rates, or an intentional scheme to 
price at a low level, one should expect the probability of an upward revision 
to be lower when the bank and counsel have worked together more 
frequently.  However, the analysis shows the opposite.  Figure 3 shows 
these probabilities in the raw data. 
  
 
 145. A possible contrary interpretation would be that repeated interactions cause the 
underwriter to be less effective when negotiating the price with the issuer.  However, as 
explained below in the discussion of integer versus decimal pricing, this interpretation is 
unlikely. 
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Figure 3:  Upward Price Revisions 
 
As Figure 3 shows, there is greater propensity for upward price 
correction, and efforts to reduce underpricing, when banks and their 
lawyers are frequent collaborators.  When banks and their counsel do not 
work together often, upward price revision occurs a little more than 45 
percent of the time.  However, when the two are frequent collaborators, the 
probability is nearly 60 percent. 
To measure this effect precisely, I employ a probit regression to 
determine whether the offer price was revised upward past the maximum of 
the initial offer range for the sample of issues that showed a significant 
increase in value (20 percent and 30 percent above the upper filing range on 
the thirtieth trading day, controlling for S&P returns during that time 
period).  Panel A of Appendix Table 3 shows the results of the probit 
regression (marginal effects are reported).  Frequent collaborators are 8 to 9 
percent more likely to correctly revise the filing price upward past the high 
end of the initial offer range for strong performers.146   This finding in turn 
further supports a conclusion that relational dynamics between the 
underwriter and its counsel help to improve the deal overall.  The upward 
price correction implies, however, that the lead underwriter is capturing less 
of the benefits of underpricing because it means that their favored 
institutional clients will not gain as much as they otherwise might have.  
 
 146. Other studies that examine price revision typically measure from the midpoint of the 
initial offer range to the closing price on the first day of trading. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, 
supra note 53, at 2830–34.  I use the high end of the offer range to the first day closing price, 
which results in a smaller calculated price increase.  The measure is intentionally 
conservative, to err on the side of caution.  Employing the methodology used in other studies 
would have made the results in this specification appear stronger. 
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Nonetheless, as upward revision in these deals is also accompanied by very 
strong first day performance, it is reasonable to conclude that the overall 
effect is beneficial—the price is more accurate, the issuer gets more than it 
otherwise might have, and the underwriter and its customers still garner a 
very large share of the value. 
I note that an alternative possible interpretation posited in the literature is 
that price revision in fact represents lower levels of due diligence by the 
underwriter and counsel prior to the offering.147  Scholars advancing this 
interpretation reason that pricing can be done one of two ways:  through 
pre-offering information discovery (via due diligence) or through 
bookbuilding, during which investors convey pricing information to the 
issuer and underwriters by means of the demand they express for the 
stock.148  Some scholars posit that there is a tradeoff between due diligence-
related ex ante pricing and ex post price discovery through bookbuilding.149  
If enough information is available to price the stock before bookbuilding, 
then the disclosure will be more informative and there will be a lower 
incidence of price revision during bookbuilding.150  Likewise, if less 
diligence is conducted, then disclosure will be less informative and use 
more boilerplate language, resulting in the need to rely on the bookbuilding 
process for price discovery and leading to more price revision once 
bookbuilding is complete and demand for the stock is known.151  It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the plausibility of this 
interpretation in detail.  However, I note that even if this interpretation is 
correct, it would support the conclusion that the repeated representations 
are related to an increasingly better outcome for the underwriter.  This is 
because the underwriter, if given a choice, would prefer to allow for price 
discovery ex post through bookbuilding over conducting costly and time-
consuming research ex ante.152  According to this interpretation, from the 
underwriter’s perspective, ex post price discovery is more efficient because 
the underwriter expends fewer resources than it would through more 
diligence (which is expensive and time-consuming), but is still just as well 
off, if not better off, because it does not suffer ill effects from underpricing, 
and may even benefit from it.  Under this interpretation, the price revision 
result implies that price discovery is taking place during bookbuilding, 
which is efficient from the underwriter’s perspective.  
b.  Isolating the Effects of Interaction from 
Experience or Reputation 
To test whether the results with respect to price performance could be 
driven by the experience or reputation of counsel or the underwriters, I 
 
 147. See generally id. 
 148. See generally id. 
 149. See generally id. 
 150. See generally id. 
 151. See generally id. 
 152. See generally id. 
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construct variables to account for the experience of both as signaled by the 
number of deals done in a given industry and within a given time period.  I 
also create variables to represent the market share of each bank and firm 
during the year preceding any particular deal, to provide a measure of the 
prestige of each firm.  I use these variables in the regressions specified 
above to see if they impact the result, and find that they do not.  These 
results are reported in Appendix Tables 7, 8, 11, and 12.  That measures of 
both bank and law firm experience, as well as measures of reputation as 
proxied by market share, do not change the estimates in the model strongly 
indicates that the results are not driven by experience and substantive skill, 
or by reputation and signaling effects with respect to either the banks or the 
firms.  This in turn provides support for the conclusion that relational 
factors resulting from repeated interaction drive the results. 
4.  Litigation 
The filing of securities litigation is a salient indicator of deal 
performance, particularly if it happens within a relatively short period of 
time following the IPO.153  Securities liability can arise for numerous 
reasons and does not necessarily indicate problems with the lawyers or their 
relationship with their clients.  Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either 
increased or decreased litigation may indicate either weaker or stronger 
disclosure and deals. 
In order to examine whether interaction has any impact on litigation, I 
perform a probit regression on the occurrence of class action lawsuits 
within six months and within one year154 of an IPO for which the 
underwriter and the underwriter’s counsel were frequent collaborators.  
While the timeframes are somewhat arbitrary, it is often the case that IPO-
related class actions are filed within the first year.155  Controls are the same 
as those used in the previous regressions.  The results are shown in Panel A 
of Appendix B Table 4. 
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between litigation and 
frequent interaction between the underwriter and its counsel within the 
preceding year.  The negative coefficient for class actions within six months 
indicates that, if anything, there may be a very small decrease in the 
probability of short-term litigation, but there is not enough of a relationship 
to draw any strong conclusions.  The lack of significant result remains for 
deals within the past two and three years as well.  The lack of relationship is 
 
 153. Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in the 
dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to the same issuer.  
This number constitutes 4.36 percent of the dataset. 
 154. The six-month and one-year cutoffs are more conservative than those used in other 
studies of IPO litigation. See, e.g., Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO 
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315 (2002) (analyzing the occurrence of litigation at any 
time after the IPO).  The six-month and one-year cutoff are used to ensure that litigation is 
related to the IPO, and in particular, the IPO-related work product that the lawyers would 
have produced. 
 155. See id. at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed). 
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noteworthy in comparison to the incidence of litigation seen in relation to 
other interactions, as discussed below. 
Before concluding the analysis of litigation as well as short-term price 
performance, I should note another prominent, but unlikely, theory of 
underpricing that could affect the interpretation.  This theory explains 
underpricing as a form of insurance against IPO-related litigation.156  To 
understand why this might make sense, consider that section 11 of the 
Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misstatements in a 
prospectus that lead to losses by investors.157  Underwriting banks have 
been able to escape liability in such lawsuits by claiming that they 
conducted adequate due diligence and that statements in the prospectus 
were true to the best of their knowledge;158 however, issuing companies are 
not able to employ a due diligence defense and therefore bear strict liability 
for material misstatements that result in losses to investors.159  Liability 
under section 11 is limited to the difference between the market price of the 
stock and the offering price.160  In practice, this means that an issuer faces 
potential liability any time its stock price drops below the offering price 
after the IPO, because even frivolous claims usually settle before the 
existence of any material misstatement or omission is ever adjudicated on 
the merits.161  With that danger in mind, issuers and their underwriters 
might use underpricing as a form of insurance against section 11 liability 
because if the offering price is low enough, it is very unlikely that the 
market price will drop below it.162 
 
 156. See generally Tiniç, supra note 134 (originating the hypothesis that underpricing 
serves as insurance for litigation). See also Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–11 
(providing empirical support for the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing). 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012). 
 158. See, e.g., Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y. 
1968) (establishing the due diligence defense for non-issuer defendants in prospectus-related 
litigation if the defendant can show reasonable grounds for that belief after a reasonable 
investigation into the truth of the alleged misstatements). 
 159. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3). 
 160. See id. § 77k(e). 
 161. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 35, 35–36 (2009) (noting that securities class actions 
almost always end in settlement regardless of the merits because “defendants, anxious to 
avoid the distraction of litigation, high defense attorney fees, negative publicity surrounding 
a securities lawsuit, and the specter of potentially bankrupting damages, may be willing to 
pay a ‘nuisance’ settlement to make the case go away, even when they perceive the 
likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding at trial as rather low”).  The perception of high levels 
of frivolous litigation was one of the motivations behind the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigations Reform Act of 1995. Id. 
 162. The issuer and underwriters can be—and often are—sued under section 10 and Rule 
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with IPO-related losses. See id. 
at 41–42.  Damages for such actions are not limited by the offering price, but the issuer is 
not subject to strict liability for damages in such cases. Compare Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that “§ 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] was 
addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose 
liability for negligent conduct alone”), and 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (providing for “damages 
caused by” reliance on material misstatements or omissions), with 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) 
(providing for strict liability), and 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (permitting damages “not exceeding 
the price at which the security was offered to the public”).  I focus in this section on liability 
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If underpricing is insurance against litigation, then one might interpret 
the first day price jump results above, and the lack of any reduction in 
probability in litigation reported in this section, to conclude that frequent 
interaction is causing issuers to pay for costly insurance that is having no 
measurable effect.  This would, of course, indicate a negative outcome from 
repeated interactions. 
However, while the underpricing-as-insurance argument makes logical 
sense, it is widely disputed, and a priori problematic for a number of 
reasons.  First, there is evidence that underpricing leads to higher share 
turnover in the aftermarket as investors who bought early seek to make a 
quick profit by selling their cheaply purchased shares into the rising 
market.163  Higher share turnover in the aftermarket, in turn, is an input of 
increased litigation.164  Therefore, underpricing may be just as likely to 
draw litigation as is it is to deter it. 
Second, and more significantly, using underpricing as litigation insurance 
does not make economic sense because it would be vastly more expensive 
than what would be warranted given the expected costs of IPO litigation.165  
This is because the costs given up by the issuer due to high levels of 
underpricing are likely to be much higher than the ex ante expected cost of 
litigation in most circumstances, even taking into account non-liability 
related transaction costs, such as the costs of counsel, reputational costs, 
and management’s time and energy costs.166   
 
under section 11 of the Securities Act because that section is the primary source of liability 
for IPO firms, see Choi et al., supra note 161, at 41, and provides much of the rationale for 
the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing, see Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 
309–13. 
 163. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum, 
and Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 107 (2002) (describing this model as 
an alternative interpretation). 
 164. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 320–21.  Lowry and Shu use market turnover 
as an input into litigation risk. See id. at 321 (“Stock turnover, measured as the proportion of 
shares traded at least once during a given period, is also related to plaintiffs’ incentives to 
initiate lawsuits.  This is because shareholder damages are generally increasing in the 
number of shares traded at the allegedly misleading prices. . . .  Not surprisingly, sued firms 
have significantly higher turnover.”). 
 165. This point has been made by numerous critics of the litigation insurance hypothesis. 
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 19–20. 
 166. To illustrate, the average probability of class action litigation within the first year for 
all deals in the dataset is 4 percent.  The average payment for settlement of securities class 
actions is approximately $3 million. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 310, 315 (noting 
average settlement payment of $3.3 million in “lawsuit sample . . . of all firms that had an 
IPO between 1988 and 1995”).  Meanwhile, the average level of underpricing is closer to 20 
percent, which on average amounts to $300 million left on the table given the average deal 
size in the dataset (or $152 million in terms of median deal size in the dataset).  This means 
that underpricing would be the equivalent of paying roughly $152 million to $300 million to 
avoid an average expected litigation cost of $1.2 million ($3 million * .04), making 
underpricing an extraordinarily high price to pay to avoid litigation cost, even accounting for 
reputational and other harms that result from litigation. See also Qing Hao, Securities 
Litigation, Withdrawal Risk and Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 438, 454 (2011) 
(reporting the results of a recent empirical analysis showing no reliable relation between 
underpricing and subsequent litigation risk for U.S. IPOs from 1996 to 2005); Jay R. Ritter, 
Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 347, 354 (2011) 
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Third, it has been widely noted that other countries with developed 
securities markets have far less securities litigation, and are much less 
plaintiff friendly, but still have underpricing similar to what is seen in many 
U.S. IPOs.167  Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of any association 
between lawyer-client familiarity and reduction in litigation rates has any 
negative implications for the other results reported here. 
5.  Disclosure 
The amount of different types of disclosure in the prospectus does not, by 
itself, indicate a positive or negative outcome for the deal.  However, 
because disclosure is a facet of the deal most directly influenced by 
counsel, it is useful to analyze it, both to inform the other results and to 
provide some insight on the possible mechanisms at work in the results 
previously reported. 
Appendix Table 10, Panel A, shows the effects of repeated interactions 
between an underwriter and its counsel and risk factors.  The table 
demonstrates a significant effect from repeated interaction:  each additional 
deal together in the preceding year is associated with a 30 percent increase 
in the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors.  For repeated 
deals in the past two years, the marginal increase is 20 percent, and for 
three years, it is 15 percent, all significant at the .1 percent level.168 
The content and impact of different risk factors vary, and so it is not 
always clear which party, if any, benefits from increased levels of such 
disclosure.  On the one hand, it is potentially prophylactic against litigation.  
On the other hand, it may lead to underpricing and even provide a roadmap 
for litigation.  Generally speaking, the underwriter in a typical IPO tends to 
favor more negative disclosure than the issuer.  This is due to the fact that, 
unlike the issuer, the underwriter benefits from negative disclosure, as it 
gains protection from liability while suffering few of its costs, because it 
can benefit even if the offering price is negatively impacted.169  Therefore, 
from a better team dynamic between underwriters and counsel one would 
predict an increased proportion of negative to positive disclosure (estimated 
here as the share of the prospectus devoted to risk factors). 
Despite the ambiguity of the level of disclosure, given the lack of 
association between repeated interactions and litigation demonstrated in the 
preceding section, a tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in 
risk factor disclosure is beneficial.  The benefit likely inures to the 
underwriter more than the issuer, as the underwriter stands to lose less and 
 
(“This lawsuit avoidance theory of underpricing has the problem that leaving money on the 
table is an incredibly inefficient way of deterring lawsuits:  The opportunity cost in foregone 
proceeds is $1 for what is at most a few cents of expected benefits.”). 
 167. See Ritter, supra note 166, at 354 (“[T]he litigation environment in the U.S. is fairly 
unique, yet the magnitude of IPO underpricing in the U.S. is not unusual.”). 
 168. Results for share of the prospectus devoted to MD&A were not significant and not 
reported. 
 169. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810; see also Nocera, supra note 14. 
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gain more from underpricing and thus has a different cost-benefit analysis 
with respect to litigation risk. 
6.  Time to Deal Completion 
Repeated interaction reveals a small but significant positive effect on the 
length of time to complete a deal.  If repeated interaction and better 
teamwork yield positive benefits, one would expect efficiency and speed to 
be one of them.  Therefore, I test the data to see if repeated interactions 
between underwriters and counsel lead to a decrease in the length of time 
that deals take.  As mentioned in the previous section, many factors could 
influence the timing of the offering, and some of those factors cannot be 
controlled for in a regression.  Therefore, while the lack of a trend would 
not necessarily be troubling, a general trend would provide further evidence 
of negative or positive effects from repeated interactions. 
I analyze the length of time between the date that Form S-1 is filed with 
the SEC and the offer date.  This time period is only a portion of the entire 
length of the deal, but it nonetheless must serve as a proxy because it is the 
only observable information regarding the length of time to complete the 
deal.  Because the timing of the deal may depend on market conditions in a 
relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the offering, I construct a 
dummy variable for each quarter of the IPO year, instead of using the entire 
year variable as in other regressions.  In addition, the number of lead 
managers in the deal have a significant impact on deal length (each 
additional manager increases the deal length by approximately six days), so 
the managers are added to the group of controls.  In my preferred 
specification, I limit the analysis to deals that are completed within one 
year, because the presence of a number of long-dated deals in the dataset 
raises the possibility of overstating the true effect of repeated interactions.  
The results are reported in Panel A of Appendix Table 5. 
The results of the analysis indicate a modest but significant reduction by 
almost two days in the amount of time to complete a deal, for each repeated 
interaction within the past year.  This effect fades in both magnitude and 
significance for repeated interactions within two and three years.  In 
general, however, the trend supports the idea that better teamwork produces 
better results. 
7.  Integer Versus Decimal Pricing 
The type of price arrived at likewise indicates positive benefits for the 
underwriter from repeated interaction with its counsel.  Other research on 
IPOs hypothesizes that if an IPO is priced using a non-integer number then 
the issuer’s management team had more information and negotiated more 
effectively over price than might otherwise be the case.170  The reason for 
 
 170. See Daniel J. Bradley et al., Negotiation and the IPO Offer Price:  A Comparison of 
Integer Vs. Non-Integer IPOs, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 517, 518 (2004) 
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this conclusion is that arriving at whole numbers in a negotiation suggests 
less thorough analysis of relevant criteria and more reliance on anchoring 
techniques.171 
Panel A of Appendix Table 6 reports the results of a probit regression 
measuring the change in probability of a non-integer price with repeated 
interactions.  The results show a small but significant effect, with each 
repeated interaction within the past year resulting in a 1.3 percent lower 
chance of the final price being an integer.172  Significance does not remain 
for interactions over two and three years.  Nonetheless, this may indicate a 
stronger negotiating position on the part of the underwriter, aided by 
assistance from familiar counsel. 
D.  Interactions Between Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel 
One might expect the lawyers on either side of the table in a capital 
markets deal to gain perhaps the most from repeated interaction.  These 
individuals encounter each other frequently, and a good working 
relationship can help them to work more effectively together.  Analysis of 
frequent interaction between sets of counsel, however, yields few 
significant results. 
1.  Price Performance 
As before, first day price increase is examined for counsel-counsel repeat 
interactions.  The results for first day price increase, reported in Panel B of 
Appendix Table 1, indicate a moderate but significant effect.  These 
significant but modest price gains are sustained over thirty, sixty, and 
ninety days, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 2 
2.  Price Revision 
I again examine the probability of correct upward price revision and find 
there is a weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) relationship between 
interactions and the probability of upward price revision when the first day 
bounce is 30 percent or more.  No other significant results are seen.  These 
results are reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 3. 
3.  Litigation 
Each additional interaction between sets of counsel is associated with a 
small (0.5 percent) and weakly significant (at the 10% level) decrease in 
class action litigation filed within six months following the IPO offer date.  
No significant relationship is seen when the time period is expanded to one 
year, as shown in Panel B of Appendix Table 4. 
 
(arguing that non-integer prices represent more negotiation effort and less uncertainty 
regarding offer price). 
 171. See id. at 528–29.  This methodology is borrowed from Bradley and his coauthors. 
 172. Out of 2265 deals in the dataset, 383 (14.03 percent) came to a final price using a 
decimal number. 
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4.  Disclosure 
Counsel deals together continue the trend of marginally increasing risk 
factor disclosure, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 10.  The degree 
of increase remains relatively constant regardless of whether the previous 
interaction has taken place in the past one year (19 percent), two years (17.3 
percent), or three years (15 percent).173  Once again, this result is obtained 
after controlling for factors that might otherwise influence risk factors or 
the riskiness of the firm overall:  the firm’s industry, the time period, the 
age of the company, the size of the company (measured by company 
assets), and the involvement of sophisticated venture capital investors.  This 
suggests that the inclusion of additional risk factors may be driven more by 
norms of legal practice with regard to prospectus drafting than by anything 
related to the deal itself or the parties at the table. 
As above, risk factors increasing while the probability of a securities 
class action either decreases or bears no relationship to risk factors, could 
indicate that the two sets of counsel, working together more frequently, are 
doing marginally better work and protecting firms from litigation (at least 
in the first six months). 
5.  Deal Timing and Integer Pricing 
No significant relationship was identified between repeated interaction 
among sets of counsel and deal completion times or the probability of an 
integer final price, as shown in Panel B of Appendix Tables 5 and 6.  This 
is somewhat surprising, given that better team dynamics would presumably 
create a more efficient process.  However, the length of time a deal takes 
may be affected by many factors outside the lawyers’ control.  The timing 
of the deal is also usually managed by the underwriters more than other 
parties at the table, so perhaps it should not be surprising that counsel does 
not affect it.  Testing for integer pricing yields a marginally significant, but 
very small negative result.  This result indicates that counsel pairs may have 
a very small effect on what kind of price issuers choose.  However, this 
result may also be an artifact of the reality that there are many counsel 
interactions and relatively few non-integer prices in the dataset. 
E.  Summary of Findings and Interpretation of Results 
Taken together, the results above indicate some positive benefits 
associated with repeated collaboration between underwriters and their 
counsel, as well as between different sets of lawyers on opposite sides of a 
deal.  In particular, when the lead underwriter and its counsel have worked 
together frequently, deals tend to perform better in the short and long term, 
and they are less marked by signs of pricing error or excessively high, 
unmitigated underpricing.  While negative and risk-related disclosure 
 
 173. Each is significant at the 1 percent level.  Results for share of the prospectus devoted 
to MD&A were not significant and not reported. 
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increase somewhat in such interactions, there is no corresponding 
association with litigation in the first year, when IPO-related litigation is 
most likely.  The data also suggests that deals get done slightly faster.  
Similar results are evident for deals in which both sets of counsel have 
worked together frequently, except that there is a small but significant 
negative marginal effect on litigation within the first year but there is no 
significant effect on deal timing.  This suggests that counsels’ relational 
dynamics in these situations improves the transaction by reducing 
uncertainty, the cost of information production, and lowering agency costs 
and transaction costs. 
With respect to the two sets of counsel, the results are more mixed.  First 
day price jump increases modestly in repeated interactions, indicating low 
levels of underpricing.  Nonetheless, no significant result is seen with 
respect to price correction.  This could simply be due to more accurate 
pricing to begin with, or it might indicate that repeated interactions between 
counsel have a relatively modest impact on the ability of the deal team to 
market the deal.  The strong price performance over the first thirty, sixty, 
and ninety days is also related to repeated interactions, further indicating 
good deal execution.  Repeated interactions are weakly associated with 
lower probability of litigation, at least in the first six months after the 
offering. 
F.  Caveats and Robustness Checks 
While the associations described above provide interesting insights, the 
regression analysis alone gives no assurance that some underlying factors 
are not driving the repeated selection of both the banks and the different 
sets of counsel, as well as the results.  For instance, the industry of the 
company going public, the size of the company, the time period of the IPO, 
or the recent experience of a particular law firm in a particular industry 
might all factor into the choice to use the same counsel for multiple deals in 
a given time period.  At the same time, such factors could influence the 
results of the deal, without regard to the effect of repeated interaction.  To 
conclude that repeated interaction is indeed driving the results, I must rule 
out the impacts of such factors as drivers of the results.  I employ a number 
of strategies to do so. 
As previously explained, to rule out the impact of time period and 
industry, I use year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the interaction 
of the two.  In alternative specifications, I use a fixed effect for the quarter 
in which an IPO occurs, interacted with the industry of the issuing 
company.  I also use the geographic location by ZIP code of each firm, and 
the results remain.  In my main specification, I also use a fixed effect for 
each underwriter, with no significant change in the results.  In addition, 
there are several years in the dataset in which IPO activity, as well as 
several of the outcome variables analyzed in the paper, is especially high.  
The years 1999 and 2000 have especially high numbers of IPOs (as well as 
repeated interactions) and are associated with very high levels of 
underpricing and litigation.  Although the use of fixed effects for these 
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years removes the mean of the impact of these years on the outcomes, as a 
further test of robustness I remove all deals completed in these years from 
the data set completely, and the results remain. 
As discussed above, law firm experience and reputation are also unlikely 
to be driving the results.  When a control for law firm experience is used, 
the results do not change.  In addition, if “law firm deals” is used as a 
dependent variable in the analysis, no effect is apparent.  Further, the 
consensus among practitioners interviewed for the study is that the markets 
do not consider the reputation of the law firms representing the parties in 
the deal when making investment decisions.  This may reflect that all of the 
firms who do IPOs are of sufficiently high quality, and therefore reputation 
does not matter per se to investors.  But in any event, law firm reputation 
and experience do not explain the results. 
Nor is it problematic that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm is 
often based on either a previous relationship or recent experience doing 
IPOs in a given industry.  Indeed, that explanation would be consistent with 
the findings above, as well as other empirical research on clients’ choice of 
lawyers.174  It would be difficult to imagine how such previous 
relationships would be related to the outcomes analyzed herein, except 
through the relational effects I am studying.  With respect to the law firms’ 
recent experience and reputation, I employ several strategies to rule these 
out as confounding factors.  To rule out the possibility that law firm quality 
or experience is driving the result, I construct variables to represent the 
number of deals each firm has done in the previous one year, two years, and 
three years in each industry and overall.  These variables do not change the 
results when added to the model.  I also add fixed effects for certain law 
firms that appear most frequently in the dataset, and the results remain.175 
Finally, other factors that may influence selection of counsel, as well as 
the outcome variables, are factors related to the quality of the deal, 
availability of information about the issuer, and sophistication of the 
parties.  These factors are:  the presence of venture capital or private equity 
investors, the age of the company (which impacts the amount of 
information available about the company), the value of the company in 
terms of total assets, the value of the company as determined by book value 
per share, the size of the underwriting syndicate, and the proportion of 
insider stock sold in the deal.176  Including these factors in the model yields 
the same results as those obtained in my preferred specification.  All results 
 
 174. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1001. 
 175. In particular, Wilson Sonsini appears a disproportionately high number of times on 
the dataset (n=426).  Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini does not change the results.  
Removing Wilson Sonsini completely from the dataset lowers the precision of the estimates 
in the model such that they are no longer significant, which is to be expected when removing 
such a large number of data points.  Nonetheless the results remain even under that 
specification. 
 176. Recall also that deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard 
control in all specifications. 
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discussed in the subsection are reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 8 for the 
first day price bounce and probability of litigation variables. 
To illustrate the point further, the results with respect to an issuing 
company’s counsel could be interpreted to suggest that some underlying 
factors are driving both underpricing and litigation risk, as well as the 
selection of counsel.  This explanation draws from theories of underpricing 
as both insurance for, and deterrent to, litigation previously mentioned.177  
Under this theory, the level of underpricing might correspond to the 
litigation risk inherent in the issue, on the assumption that pricing lower 
would reduce the probability of the issuance being overpriced.  An 
overpriced issue draws more litigation because when the price inevitably 
falls in the market, investors lose money and often will bring suit.  
Moreover, where there is inherent uncertainty regarding the issuer’s 
valuation or industry, underpricing may further help to mitigate the 
associated risks.178 
The tests described here make this interpretation unlikely, because if this 
story were true, one would expect to see the underpricing and litigation 
effects disappear when controlling for factors that would ex ante impact the 
risk of litigation for a particular firm.  However, that result is not observed.  
The systematic incremental nature of the results (i.e., that each additional 
interaction is associated with an incremental increase in underpricing and 
litigation on average) also makes it unlikely that there is an underlying 
factor driving the results as well as the selection of counsel.  In order for 
such underlying factors to be at work, it would have to be true that the 
parties selecting members of the deal team are doing so based on a very 
accurate prediction of the future levels of underpricing and litigation.  This 
would mean not only systematically predicting the level of underpricing 
and litigation with a high degree of accuracy, but also choosing different 
counsel and banks to work together and across the table from each other a 
specific number of times based on the specific prediction for each deal.  As 
discussed above, that scenario is extremely unlikely, especially once other 
possible confounding factors are controlled for. 
III.  DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
The findings above indicate that the frequency of lawyer-client 
interaction bears a significant relationship to the quality of IPO deal 
outcomes.  This has implications for how deals are currently structured and 
the lawyers’ conception of their role in a transaction.  Below, I discuss what 
these implications are for teamwork in deal making and the principal-agent 
relationship between lawyers and their clients. 
 
 177. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309, 320–21; see also Alexander, supra note 
12, at 19 (“A large literature has attempted to explain IPO underpricing.  One intriguing 
theory is that IPOs are underpriced as a form of insurance against legal liability based on 
claims of federal securities law violations on the offering.”). 
 178. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 18–20 (explaining the litigation theory). 
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A.  Lawyers, Clients, and Teamwork 
The results described above do not reveal the precise mechanism by 
which repeated interaction relates to the deal outcomes I have examined.  
More research is required to elaborate precisely how such a relationship 
might work.  However, a plausible explanation is that repeated interaction 
and familiarity produce better teamwork, which results in reduced 
transaction costs, better disclosure, and more effective use of each team 
member’s time and expertise.  In this section, I discuss how the findings 
above might fit into existing models of law practice.  I start by discussing 
how the findings are consistent with the role of teamwork in transactional 
practice and argue that teamwork should be considered more carefully and 
intentionally with respect to lawyers and their clients.  I also discuss some 
potentially problematic aspects of teamwork for lawyers, and I argue that 
team dynamics should be more actively designed and managed to avoid 
these problems. 
1.  Importance of Teamwork for Deal Lawyers 
IPO transactions can fairly be described as team production endeavors, 
although teamwork is only starting to be considered seriously in legal 
theory or practice.179  When teamwork is discussed, it often focuses on 
teamwork among lawyers working together in a firm, but leaves out 
consideration of the teamwork between lawyers and their clients, or 
teamwork with opposing counsel.  Effective cooperation across these 
different dimensions is also important to a lawyer’s effectiveness, and it 
warrants further consideration. 
Teams in the legal context can be defined, borrowing from social 
science, as a bounded social system whose members are interdependent and 
whose members are working toward a shared purpose.180  The benefits of 
teamwork over individual effort have been well documented.181  Despite 
this fact, and the prevalence of team tasks in the practice of law, the 
profession is only beginning to provide the necessary attention to relational 
skills or to the systematic study of a matter of theoretical importance or 
skills training.  Lawyers and their professional governance are more 
frequently analyzed through the lens of principal-agent theory,182 although 
an equally appropriate lens would be that of team production theory in 
certain instances.  This is especially true when lawyers are engaged in 
capital markets deals.  While the lawyer-client relationship has principal 
 
 179. Some excellent examples do exist, however. See, e.g., Utset, supra note 3, at 275–
80; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247–55 (1999) (describing corporate outputs as the products of 
team, rather than principal-agent efforts). 
 180. See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 10, at 777. 
 181. See, e.g., JACK D. OSBORN ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED WORK TEAMS:  THE NEW 
AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1990); see also Paul Osterman, Supervision, Discretion, and Work 
Organization, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 380, 380–84 (1994). 
 182. See, e.g., Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–34 (analyzing the tension 
between lawyers as agents and their clients as principals). 
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and agency features, the lawyer in such situations does not simply await 
orders from the client to act upon; the lawyers help to shape those wishes 
by conveying advice and information about what is appropriate and wise in 
a given context.183  They often help to prompt the client to action and 
inform them about what they should be doing at a given point in time in the 
deal.184 
Relationships and repeated interactions play a critical role in establishing 
good team processes.185  The relational dynamics emerging from repeated 
interactions have the capacity to produce significantly better team 
performance and, in theory, better output.186  One common feature of teams 
that perform well is familiarity among the team members and experience 
working together multiple times in the past.187  This point is illustrated in a 
study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
showing that team functioning, rather than mechanical problems or 
technical ability of individual pilots, is the key cause of most airline 
accidents.188  This study highlights a fact which is born out in NTSB 
statistics:  that 73 percent of accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s 
first day flying together, and 44 percent of those accidents happened on the 
crew’s very first flight.189  Research on airline crews and teams of doctors 
further shows that experienced teams who have worked together in the past 
perform significantly better—even when fatigued—than do rested crews 
who have not worked together before.190  Relational benefits translate to 
deals as well.  Parties involved develop trust and learn each others’ norms 
for communication, language coding, risk tolerance, preferences, preferred 
 
 183. See Blair & Stout, supra note 179, at 259 (“[P]art of the agent’s job is to figure out 
what needs to be done (a situation we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most 
public corporations).  A related point is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear 
who the principal is and who the agent is in the particular relationship or transaction under 
study.  Yet many of the most important relationships inside corporations may be more 
ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive inputs and neither 
may have authority over the other.”). 
 184. This point will be familiar to many who have practiced in capital markets and was 
confirmed by practitioner interviews. 
 185. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“In that sense, team cognitive 
structures, emergent states, and routinized behavior patterns are the echoes of repeated 
process interactions and, hence, are indicative of the nature and quality of dynamic team 
processes.”). 
 186. See id. 
 187. See id. (“[R]epeated interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to 
regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent 
process interactions.  Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”). 
 188. See Robert L. Helmreich, On Error Management:  Lessons from Aviation, 320 BMJ 
781, 781–85 (2000); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and 
Aviation:  Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BMJ 745, 745–49 (2000); see also Kozlowski & 
Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86–87 (explaining an experiment where teams were given the task of 
creating origami birds and became more efficient when they repeated the task together, but 
less efficient when members of the team were replaced with new members). 
 189. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250. 
 190. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 77–81. 
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roles, strengths, weaknesses, and working styles.191  As lawyer and client 
come to better understand each other, the lawyer is more able to anticipate 
his or her client’s needs, negotiating positions, and areas of focus.192  The 
lawyer can act as a better agent in managing the transaction and in dealing 
with the issuer and its counsel in the conduct of due diligence and 
disclosure drafting.  The investment bank client, in turn, is freer to engage 
in the business-oriented side of the deal, with an informational and legal 
product that matches its expectations and needs.  Thus, the client is able to 
focus on marketing, negotiating, and engaging in other activities within its 
expertise that are needed to make the deal successful. 
2.  Making the Whole Better than the Sum of Its Parts 
While good teamwork can be beneficial, it does not necessarily appear 
spontaneously, and optimal team dynamics must be cultivated.  Team 
efforts are generally found to be better than individual ones, but it is not 
always the case that teams produce gains exceeding those of the sum of 
their parts.193  Groups can suffer from process losses, such as coordination, 
and motivation problems can erode the benefit of team effort.194  This 
reality has been born out in experiments comparing actual teams and 
“nominal” teams (teams that never work together but whose output is 
constructed by aggregating the output of each individual) in the 
performance of a given task.195  In many of these experiments, adding the 
output of members of the nominal team produces results that are as good as 
or better than those obtained by the actual teams.196  This research suggests 
that teams do not automatically get better results simply by virtue of being a 
team.197  Repeated interaction appears to aid team dynamics over time, but 
other useful team skills may be less intuitive.198  Creating an effective team 
requires certain conditions to be met, and the presence of those conditions 
will increase the likelihood that a team will function well.199  In addition, 
research suggests that collaboration among lawyers may become harder to 
achieve when the lawyers face performance pressure, or when a client 
situation is perceived to be high stakes.200  An IPO can easily become such 
 
 191. See id. at 84 (“[W]e conclude that a shared team mental model that captures the 
structure of relations among key aspects of the team, its task and role system, and its 
environment is a key emergent cognitive structure that shapes coordination processes 
relevant to team goals and their accomplishment.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, 
at 17–19 (discussing the importance of coordination among deal team members and the need 
to have a common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished). 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50. 
 194. See generally IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1972). 
 195. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 246. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 254. 
 198. Id. at 249–50 (discussing elements of high performing teams that are not necessarily 
intuitive). 
 199. Id. at 248. 
 200. See Heidi K. Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING 
TALENT FOR SUCCESS 145, 145–46 (Rebecca Normand-Hochman ed., 2013) (discussing 
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a situation.  It is worth considering how to improve upon lawyers’ relational 
skill to avoid some of these problems.  Best practices, including relatively 
simple but effective interventions such as appointing a definite leader, 
clearly defining roles, explicitly expressing norms of behavior, and setting 
concrete expectations can improve collaboration but do not necessarily 
happen naturally.201  In addition, further research would be useful to 
discover how lawyers might be able to foster better collaboration and 
leverage some of the benefits of familiarity, even without the benefit of 
repeated interactions with other lawyers or clients.  For example, a more 
intentional focus on group processes and communication norms might lead 
to better group interaction without having to learn by trial and error.  
Moreover, learning to recognize and diagnose group process problems early 
on might lead to better collaboration even without repeated interactions. 
That relational skill can have such a large impact on a transaction implies 
that collaboration and teamwork should be further addressed in the legal 
profession in order to garner more of its benefits.  It is often assumed that 
members of teams do not require any particular additional skills to be 
effective team members.202  That is rarely the case.  This may be especially 
true for individuals trained as lawyers, given the individualistic nature of 
many of the pursuits that gain recognition in legal education.203  If it is true 
that relational skill and effective teamwork can have a significant and 
tangible impact on the substantive outcomes of a business transaction, then 
relational skill should be added alongside technical knowledge of regulation 
and value creation in the set of tools important to transaction cost 
engineering.  It is worth considering how a lawyer’s team management and 
process management skills come into play in this context and how they 
might be honed and enhanced. 
In addition to familiarity and repeated interaction, research has identified 
conditions which facilitate effective collaboration and without which 
collaboration rarely yields results better than what individuals can do on 
their own.  These conditions include:  setting clear boundaries for group 
membership and involvement, ensuring that team members have a clear 
idea of the team’s goals and direction, allowing individuals’ various levels 
of expertise to be leveraged, providing clear norms of conduct, and 
providing ample opportunities for feedback and direction on the group’s 
processes.204  While these conditions may seem simple, they are often 
overlooked.  In addition, many groups harbor incorrect assumptions about 
what makes teamwork successful.  One such assumption concerns the roles 
of team leaders.  While leaders are important for setting direction, it is 
typically better for leaders to set up the conditions that facilitate team 
 
research indicating that lawyers become less creative, and more risk averse and less likely to 
collaborate, when they perceive the stakes to be high). 
 201. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 254–56. 
 202. Id. at 254. 
 203. See id. (noting that individualistic work cultures may not readily lend themselves to 
collaboration). 
 204. See id. at 264–66. 
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functioning, as opposed to being overly directive, or overly hands-off.205  
Another commonly held assumption is that contrarian attitudes are 
corrosive to team behavior.  While someone who is overly averse to 
teamwork may be ill-suited for group work, groups tend to function best 
when they have a member who challenges group assumptions and 
orthodoxies.206  Without the voice of dissent, groups can become mediocre, 
and fall into patterns of groupthink.  The problem is that most participants 
in group work tend to shy away from challenging orthodoxies, believing 
that it will create conflict and disrupt the group dynamic.207 
These are just a few examples, and this Article does not purport to 
provide an exhaustive list of ways in which group processes can be tweaked 
so that deal teams can perform optimally.  However, the legal profession 
would have much to gain from further consideration of how to capture more 
benefits from group processes in deal making.  It is worth considering how 
such skills can be taught to practicing lawyers as well as law students.  At 
the very least, team skills should receive more emphasis and study than 
they currently do, and an awareness of relational dynamics should be 
incorporated into law school as well as continuing education curricula.  It is 
also worth considering how the incentive structures that exist in most law 
practices might be tweaked to reward team performance, as opposed to 
individual performance, such as billable hour targets which bear 
relationship to firm profitability in the short term without necessarily 
bearing any relationship to the lawyers’ ability to best serve clients. 
3.  Managing Drawbacks of Teamwork 
Group collaboration also deserves attention in the transactional context 
because of its potential to conflict with a lawyer’s agency duties.  The 
group production task that lawyers are involved in when doing an IPO 
necessarily involves partisan interests.  So-called groupthink and other 
byproducts of team production may poorly serve clients whose interests 
diverge from those of others at the table.208  This may detract from the 
benefits of team functioning and undermine the lawyer’s central role as 
advocate for his or her client.  One means of managing the tension is to 
develop a better understanding of when the role of team member and agent 
are likely to come into conflict.  This in turn requires a better understanding 
of where parties’ interests might diverge. 
However, simply understanding where interests diverge is an incomplete 
solution.  Lawyers must know how and when to raise issues and not feel the 
pressure of the group to suppress concerns.  At first glance, it may seem 
that identifying divergence of interest might be antithetical to good team 
function.  However, the ability to raise conflicts is an important component 
 
 205. See id. at 265–66. 
 206. See Diane Coutu, Why Teams Don’t Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 99, 102–
05. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See Kozlowski et al., supra note 84, at 77, 81. 
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of team functioning, and finding ways to do so may in fact enhance team 
dynamics.209  Research on team dynamics suggests that one component of 
highly effective teams is a set of norms and practices governing dispute 
resolution.210  A more explicit understanding of the interaction between 
agency and teamwork and norms promoting productive avenues of dissent 
when necessary would allow deal lawyers to leverage team dynamics while 
still remaining zealous advocates.  Lawyers’ process expertise is 
particularly suited to designing and implementing such systems, and further 
education and research in this area would yield enormous benefits to 
transactional lawyers. 
B.  Further Considerations 
While a detailed catalogue of recommendations is beyond the scope of 
this Article, I will briefly summarize some preliminary proposals and areas 
for future research.  The first basic proposal that the empirical findings of 
this Article suggest is that previous relationships might be important 
disclosure to investors in securities markets.  If familiarity between lawyers 
and bankers are significantly related to the way a stock performs in the 
market, then investors might be well served by having that information.  It 
may well be the case that the “reasonable” investor may not know or care 
about the effects of repeated interactions.  However, market analysts and 
others who provide them with information may find the disclosure more 
useful and incorporate it into their analysis of stock. 
The second overarching proposal suggested by the findings above is that 
law should focus more on the impact of relational ability as a core 
component of effective legal practice.  Though other professions have 
incorporated teamwork and collaboration as a crucial component of 
professional education, law has been slow to embrace it.  Business schools 
and medical schools routinely incorporate team tasks and skills training into 
their basic curriculum, based on compelling research that good teamwork 
fosters better results and poor teamwork fosters mistakes.  With respect to 
law, team skills are equally important, and perhaps critical to a lawyer’s 
ability to add value in a deal.  While this Article has focused on 
transactions, in the litigation context lawyers frequently work in teams as 
well.  In fact, in a law firm practice of any size, lawyers frequently engage 
in team tasks and could serve their clients far better if such tasks were 
optimally structured. 
However, for lawyers, the team dynamic takes on additional 
complications.  This suggests that not only are team skills important, but so 
is the complex skill of balancing team productivity with advocacy.  If 
familiarity has benefits for deal outcomes, it may have drawbacks as well, 
particularly for the deal lawyer, who must balance the competing concerns 
of advocacy with the coordination and cooperation that facilitate deal 
 
 209. See PFEIFFER BOOK OF SUCCESSFUL TEAM-BUILDING TOOLS 247–65 (Elaine Biech, 
ed. 2008); Hackman, supra note 6, at 255. 
 210. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250. 
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making.  Simply working repeatedly with other members of a deal team is 
not enough to promote better deal outcomes, as demonstrated by the results 
for repeated interactions between sets of lawyers.  Leveraging the benefits 
of teamwork without sacrificing the duty of agency will involve more 
intentional consideration of both and a more complex model of the deal 
negotiations than is typically described. 
CONCLUSION 
To ask how lawyers add value is to miss half the equation.  In 
transactional practice, lawyers and clients add value by working together 
effectively to accomplish a common aim.  This Article provides evidence 
that repeated lawyer-client interaction leads to better substantive deal 
outcomes.  This is a conclusion that should come as little surprise, but it has 
not previously been documented to the same degree.  The results suggest 
that lawyers do their best work when they form effective teams with their 
clients because they establish trust and learn how to optimize their roles, 
communication styles, and preferences.  This is a natural product of 
repeated interactions, but it can also be enhanced by more intentional 
awareness of the importance of team dynamics.  Precisely how lawyers can 
work better with clients is an issue that warrants further study, but it is clear 
that lawyers would benefit if the issue were addressed earlier in their 
training and more directly.  Law schools currently lack much training 
relating to teams or managing group processes, a feature which puts law 
students behind peers in professions like business and medicine.  Moreover, 
these topics are virtually absent from continuing legal education.  
Nonetheless, if lawyers are to be effective “transaction cost engineers,” 
these skills are essential, particularly at a time when the value of legal 
education is in question and corporate clients complain that lawyers lack 
value additive skills. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Figure A: 
Variables Analyzed 
 
Independent Variables of 
Interest:  Types of Lawyer 
Interactions Tested 
(IPOs together within the preceding 1 
year, 2 years, and 3 years) 
Dependent Variables  Control Variables  
 
 Lead Underwriter—
Underwriter’s Counsel 
 Issuer’s Counsel—
Underwriter’s Counsel 
 
 First trading day price 
change 
 Price change relative to the 
S&P Index at 30 days, 60 
days, 90 days post-offering 
 Probability of correct price 
revision 
 Probability of securities 
class action litigation at 6 
months, 1 year, and 3 years 
post-offering 
 Prospectus size 
 Risk Factor proportion 
 MD&A proportion 
 Time to deal completion 
(length of time from the 
filing of Form S-1 to the 
offer date) 
 Whether deal final price is 
integer or decimal  
 
 
 Offering size (as the log of 
gross proceeds) 
 IPO Year fixed effects (a 
dummy variable for each 
year in the sample) 
 IPO Industry fixed effects (a 
dummy variable for each 
industry in the sample, using 
the SEC’s 3-digit SIC 
codes) 
 Bank fixed effects (a 
dummy variable for each 
lead underwriting bank) 
 Syndicate size 
 Log age of the Issuer 
 Lead Underwriter quality 
(according to number of 
IPOs performed) 
 Lead Underwriter quality 
(by dollar market share for 
the preceding calendar year) 
 Law firm experience (as the 
number of IPO deals each 
law firm has performed in 
the preceding 1 year, 2 year, 
and 3 year periods) 
 Presence of venture capital 
firms 
 Size of inside shareholder 
stake sold into deal 
 Log of company total assets 
 Company book value per 
share 
 Geographic location of law 
firm (by city and ZIP Code) 
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Appendix Figure B:  
 Summary Statistics 
 
  
 
N 
 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
 
Total IPO Deals 2,265    
 
Lead Underwriters 2,729* 1.40 1.00 0.82 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:  
Past 1 Year 2,729* 1.80 1.00 1.59 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:  
Past 2 Years 2,729* 2.20 1.00 2.21 
 
 
Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:  
Past 3 Years 2,729* 2.46 1.00 2.62 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel 
Deals Together:  Past 1 Year 2,268* 1.77 1.00 2.15 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel 
Deals Together:  Past 2 Years 2,268* 2.16 1.00 3.17 
 
 
Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel 
Deals Together:  Past 3 Years 2,268* 2.46 1.00 4.02 
 
First Day Price Increase (percent) 2,725* 0.28 0.11 0.59 
 
Log (gross proceeds) 2,729* 17.96 17.93 1.06 
 
Company Age (years) 2,265 12.80 7.00 18.21 
 
Syndicate Size (number of banks) 2,265 11.41 9.00 8.29 
 
* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more observations than deals.  Observations are de-weighted 
accordingly to account for this. 
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Appendix Table 1:   
Opening Day Performance and Repeated Interactions 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A:  
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Past Year 
 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.030* 
(0.012) 
    
Deals Together 
in the Past 2 
Years 
 
  0.033*** 
(0.007) 
0.019* 
(0.0078) 
  
Deals Together 
in the Past 3 
Years 
    0.0257*** 
(0.0057) 
0.014* 
(0.006) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.067*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.054*** 
(0.016) 
 
0.0668*** 
(0.0115) 
 
0.053*** 
(0.0156) 
 
0.0678*** 
(0.0116) 
 
0.053*** 
(0.016) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.20 
 
 
0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.27 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel & 
Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Past Year 
 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
0.015 
(0.008) 
    
Deals Together 
in the Past 2 
Years 
 
  0.017** 
(0.052) 
0.011 
(0.005) 
  
Deals Together 
in the Past 3 
Years 
    0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.0695*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.048** 
(0.016) 
 
0.071*** 
(0.0121) 
 
0.050** 
(0.0156) 
 
0.072*** 
(0.012) 
 
0.051** 
(0.015) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.18 0.26 0.18 0.26 0.18 026 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X 
Bank Dummies  X  X  X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level 
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 2: 
30, 60 & 90 Day Price Performance 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index 
 
  30-Day   60-Day   90-Day  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Panel A:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel &  
Managing  
Underwriter 
 
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
Year 
 
 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
   
0.068*** 
(0.019) 
   
0.074*** 
(0.024) 
  
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
2 Years 
 
  
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
   
0.043*** 
(0.012) 
   
0.049*** 
(0.015) 
 
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
3 Years 
  
 
 
 
0.028*** 
(0.007) 
   
0.034*** 
(0.012) 
   
0.041*** 
(0.013) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
Number of 
Observa-
tions 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,725 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,721 
 
 
2,720 
 
 
2,720 
 
 
2,720 
 
Panel B:   
Issuer’s Counsel  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
Year 
 
 
0.022* 
(0.009) 
   
0.038* 
(0.016) 
   
0.041* 
(0.017) 
  
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
2 Years 
 
  
0.016* 
(0.007) 
   
0.030* 
(0.012) 
   
0.039** 
(0.013) 
 
Deals 
Together 
in the Past 
3 Years 
   
0.013* 
(0.006) 
   
0.025* 
(0.010) 
   
0.034** 
(0.011) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.08 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.12 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
 
0.13 
Number of 
Observa- 
tions 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,725 
 
2,721 
 
2,721 
 
2,721 
 
2,720 
 
2,720 
 
2,720 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
Industry*
Year  
Dummies 
X X X X X X X X X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases. 
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Appendix Table 3: 
Probit Analysis of Upward Revision for Strong Performers 
 
Dependent Variable:  Upward Revision 
 (1) (2) (3)   (4) 
 20% Bounce 30% Bounce 
 
Panel A:  Lead 
Underwriter & 
Underwriters’ 
Counsel 
 
Frequent Collaborator  0.270** 
(0.109) 
0.262** 
(0.113) 
0.231+ 
(0.124) 
0.224+ 
(0.129) 
 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.582*** 
(0.078) 
 
0.597*** 
(0.084) 
 
0.486*** 
(0.910) 
 
0.485*** 
(0.100) 
 
Marginal Effect (frequent) 
 
0.093** 
(0.037) 
 
0.087** 
(0.037) 
 
0.079+ 
(0.043) 
 
0.078+ 
(0.045) 
 
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625 
 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.11 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’ 
Counsel & Issuer’s 
Counsel 
 
Frequent Collaborator  0.120 
(0.096) 
0.142 
(0.101) 
0.058 
(0.111) 
0.098 
(0.118) 
 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.591*** 
(0.079) 
 
0.608*** 
(0.085) 
 
0.498*** 
(0.092) 
 
0.499*** 
(0.100) 
 
Marginal Effect (frequent) 
 
0.042 
(0.033) 
 
0.047 
(0.034) 
 
0.021 
(0.038) 
 
0.034 
(0.041) 
 
Number of Observations 964 906 698 625 
 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.15 0.10 0.11 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
   X 
 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
   X 
 
Industry*Year Dummies  
 
X 
  
   X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%,  
and 0.1% level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each  
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 4: 
Probit Analysis of Probability of Class Action Litigation 
 
Dependent Variable:  Securities Class Action Litigation Filed 
 
                                                                             Within 6 Months                                                             Within 1 Year 
                                                                                of Offer Date                                                                 of Offer Date 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Panel A:  Lead 
Underwriter & 
Underwriters’ 
Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.002 
(0.039) 
 
-0.004 
(0.428) 
0.003 
(0.027) 
-0.021 
(0.030) 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.237*** 
(0.057) 
0.254*** 
(0.070) 
0.254*** 
(0.469) 
0.244*** 
(0.056) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.0007 
(0.002) 
 
-0.0003 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.0002 
(0.002) 
 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Number of Observations 2,639 1,386 2,705 1,885 
Pseudo R2 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.09 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’ 
Counsel & Issuer’s  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.120+ 
(0.061) 
 
-0.151+ 
(0.057) 
0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
Log Gross Proceeds 
 
0.262*** 
(0.073) 
0.334*** 
(0.094) 
0.288*** 
(0.057) 
0.323*** 
(0.071) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.005+ 
(0.002) 
 
-0.01+ 
(0.005) 
 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
 
0.0005 
(0.002) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,202 
 
979 
 
2,253 
 
1,416 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.12 
 
0.19 
 
0.075 
 
0.98 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X X X X 
Bank Dummies  X  X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%,  
and 0.1% level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners;  
each bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 5: 
Time to Completion from S-1 Filing 
 
Dependent Variable:  Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer Date (in days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Panel A:  
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
1 Year 
-2.52*** 
(0.916) 
-1.76*** 
(0.580) 
    
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
2 Years 
   
-1.88** 
(0.66) 
 
-0.883 
(0.490) 
  
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
3 Years 
     
-1.70*** 
(0.577) 
 
-0.75 
(0.427) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
-8.17*** 
(2.50) 
 
-9.73*** 
(1.50) 
 
-10.55*** 
(2.56) 
 
-9.83*** 
(1.50) 
 
-10.48*** 
(2.55) 
 
-9.83*** 
(1.50) 
 
Lead 
Underwriting 
Bank 
 
6.27  
(3.70) 
 
5.87*** 
(1.99) 
 
5.53 
(3.07) 
 
5.97*** 
(1.99) 
 
5.54 
(3.07) 
 
6.01*** 
(1.99) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
 
0.22 
 
0.31 
 
0.32 
 
0.23 
 
0.20 
 
0.32 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,723 
 
2,723 
 
2,723 
 
2,723 
 
2,723 
 
2,723 
 
Panel B:  
Underwriters’  
Counsel & 
Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
1 Year 
-0.794 
(0.583) 
-0.114 
(0.483) 
    
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
2 Years 
   
-0.590 
(0.429) 
 
-0.104 
(0.372) 
  
 
Deals Together 
in the Preceding 
3 Years 
     
-0.622 
(0.344) 
 
-0.184 
(0.300) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
-12.85*** 
(2.71) 
 
-10.91*** 
(1.61) 
 
-12.86*** 
(2.72) 
 
-10.91 
(1.61) 
 
-12.85 
(2.71) 
 
-10.89 
(1.61) 
 
Lead 
Underwriting 
Bank 
 
7.29 
(4.98) 
 
5.99 
(3.22) 
 
7.25 
(4.97) 
 
5.99 
(3.21) 
 
7.26 
(4.97) 
 
5.98 
(3.21) 
 
Adj. R2 
 
 
0.15 
 
0.26 
 
0.15 
 
0.26 
 
0.15 
 
0.26 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,263 
 
2,2063 
 
2,263 
 
2,263 
 
2,263 
 
2,263 
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   Appendix Table 5 continued  
 
Dependent Variable:  Length of Time from S-1 filing to Offer Date (in days) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
IPO Quarter 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Industry 
Dummies*  X X X X X X 
IPO Quarter 
Dummies       
All Deals X  X  X  
Deal Length < 
365 Days 
  
X 
  
X 
  
X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.  
 
The sample for this analysis was limited to deals that are completed in 365 days or less from the filing of the S-1.  The reason for limiting 
the sample in this way is to give a more accurate picture of the effect of counsel interactions.  The majority of transactions in the dataset are 
completed within one year of filing of the S-1, and the presence of a number of outlier deals that took much longer than one year biased 
estimate of increased efficiency upward.  
 
In addition, as the dependent variable in this specification is a time period less than one year long, a quarter-year fixed effect is used 
instead of the IPO-year fixed effect used in other specifications. 
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Appendix Table 6: 
Probit Analysis of the Effects of Interactions on Probability  
of Non-Integer Pricing 
 
Dependent Variable:  Non-Integer Offering Price 
 (1) (2) 
 
Panel A:   
Lead Underwriter  
& Underwriters’  
Counsel   
 
Deals Together in the 
Preceding 1 Year 
 
-0.062* 
(0.026) 
-0.064* 
(0.028) 
Log Opening Price  -0.486*** 
(0.079) 
0.508*** 
(0.081) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.013* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.013* 
(0.005) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,723 
 
2,604 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.09 
 
0.11 
 
Panel B:   
Underwriters’   
Counsel  
& Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Deals Together in the  
Preceding year 
 
 
-0.071* 
(0.030) 
 
 
-0.075* 
(0.032) 
Log Opening Price 0.448*** 
(0.087) 
0.492*** 
(0.089) 
 
Marginal 
Effect (of collaboration) 
 
-0.015* 
(0.006) 
 
-0.015* 
(0.007) 
 
Number of Observations 
 
2,264 
 
2,200 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.08 
 
0.10 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
 
X 
 
X 
IPO Year Dummies 
 
X X 
Industry*Year Dummies  X 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced. 
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Appendix Table 7: 
Alternative Specification— 
Opening Day Price Increase Outcome Variable 
 
 (1) (2) 
  
Underwriter- 
Underwriter’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Past 1 Year 
 
Underwriter’s  Counsel- 
Issuer’s Counsel:  Deals in 
the Last 1 Year 
 
(1) Preferred estimate—with standard controls (standard errors) 0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.021** 
(0.007) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number 
of deals    
 
(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 40 IPO 
deals  
0.029* 
(0.013) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
 
(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 80 IPO 
deals 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
0.031 
(0.017) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar 
marketshare   
 
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar market share for IPOs in 
preceding year 
0.044*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.010) 
 
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs 
in preceding year 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.027*** 
(0.011) 
 
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals 
done 
  
 
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year 0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
 
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years  0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
 
(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years   0.049*** 
(0.012) 
0.029*** 
(0.010) 
 
(9) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals) 0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.035*** 
(0.012) 
 
Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms   
 
(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in 
the dataset 
0.072*** 
(0.019) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
 
(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank 
relationships  
0.053*** 
(0.012) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
 
Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer 
risk   
 
(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since 
founding 
0.049*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.009) 
 
(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of 
years since founding 
0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
 
(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to 
IPO 
0.047*** 
(0.011) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
 
Altering year control categories   
 
(15) IPO quarter instead of year  0.048*** 
(0.011) 
0.031*** 
(0.010) 
 
(16) Removing the year 1999  0.039*** 
(0.011) 
0.022*** 
(0.008) 
 
(17) Removing the year 2000  0.037*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.013) 
  
2015] THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN IPOs 193 
Appendix Table 8: 
Alternative Specifications for Correct Upward Price Revision* 
 
  
 (1) (2) 
  
Underwriter- 
Underwriter’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Past 1 Year 
 
Underwriter’s Counsel- 
Issuer’s Counsel:  Deals in 
the Past 1 Year 
 
(1) Preferred estimate—with standard controls (standard errors) 
 
0.087* 
(0.037) 
0.047 
(0.034) 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number 
of deals  
 
  
(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 40 
IPO deals  
 
0.100* 
(0.043) 
0.034 
(0.043) 
(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters:  more than 80 
IPO deals 
0.064 
(0.057) 
-0.013 
(0.056) 
 
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar 
marketshare 
 
  
(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar marketshare for IPOs in 
preceding year 
 
0.054** 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.018) 
 
(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for 
IPOs in preceding year 
 
0.081*** 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.022) 
Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals 
done 
 
  
(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 
year   
0.062** 
(0.021) 
0.0064** 
(0.019) 
(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years  0.060** 
(0.021) 
0.005 
(0.019) 
 
(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years   0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.003*** 
(0.019) 
 
(9) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini  
(outlier firm in number of deals ) 
0.060*** 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
 
Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms  
  
 
(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in 
the dataset 
0.059** 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.021) 
 
(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank 
relationships  
0.059** 
(0.021) 
0.022 
(0.018) 
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Appendix Table 8 continued 
 
Marginal effects reported.  Alternative specifications for other models and outcomes of interest similarly support the estimates from the 
preferred specifications discussed in this Article.  Those alternative specifications are not reported here for the sake of space economy.  
 
 
 
 
  
 (1) (2) 
  
Underwriter- 
Underwriter’s 
Counsel:  Deals in the 
Past 1 Year 
 
Underwriter’s Counsel-
Issuer’s Counsel:  Deals in 
the Past 1 Year 
 
Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer 
risk 
   
(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the number of years 
since founding 
 
0.072*** 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of 
years since founding 
0.072*** 
(0.019) 
0.025 
(0.019) 
 
(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to 
IPO 
0.065*** 
(0.020) 
0.014 
(0.018) 
 
Altering year controls 
 
  
(17) IPO quarter instead of year  0.084*** 
(0.020) 
0.026 
(0.021) 
 
(18) Removing the year 1999  0.080*** (0.022) 
-0.0007 
(0.020) 
 
(19) Removing the year 2000  0.060* (0.022) 
0.005 
(0.19) 
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Appendix Table 9: 
Limiting to IPOs Managed by Largest Banks— 
Underwriter & Underwriter’s Counsel 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past Year 
 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
 
0.041* 
(0.018) 
    
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 2 Years 
   
0.019* 
(0.008) 
 
0.026* 
(0.011) 
  
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 3 Years 
     
0.013* 
(0.0064) 
 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
 
0.049* 
(0.019) 
 
0.056** 
(0.0212) 
 
0.0487* 
(0.0192) 
 
0.055** 
(0.0210) 
 
0.0485* 
(0.0191) 
 
0.056** 
(0.0211) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies 
 
Bank Dummies 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
Manager>=40 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Manager>=80  
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
 
X 
 
 
Adj. R2 
 
 
0.28 
 
0.26 
 
0.28 
 
0.26 
 
0.28 
 
0.26 
Number of 
Observations 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
1,534 
 
940 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases. 
 
The table above reports the results of OLS regressions testing the possibility that selection is driving the observed increase in IPO market 
performance in the periods studied.  The table reports tests using the main specification for the opening day price jump and repeated 
interactions between the Lead Underwriter and its counsel, but this time limiting the sample to banks that manage at least 40 issues in the 
dataset (the top 18 banks), and to banks that manage at least 80 issues in the dataset (the top 7 banks). 
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Appendix Table 10: 
Negative Disclosure 
 
 
Panel A:  Underwriter  
& Underwriters’ Counsel 
 
Dependent Variable:  Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 1 Year  
 
0.309*** 
(0.057) 
 
 
 
 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 2 Years 
 0.200*** 
(0.040) 
 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 3 Years 
  0.150*** 
(0.035) 
 
Industry Dummies X X X 
 
IPO Year  
Dummies X X X 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies X X X 
Adj. R2 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Number of 
Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
level, respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is 
treated as being a manager in such cases. 
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Appendix Table 10 continued 
 
 
Panel B:  Underwriter’s Counsel  
& Issuer’s Counsel 
 
Dependent Variable:  Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors 
  
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 1 Year  
 
0.190*** 
(0.043) 
 
 
 
 
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 2 Years 
 0.173*** (0.031)  
 
Deals Together in 
the Past 3 Years 
  0.151*** (0.024) 
 
Industry Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
IPO Year  
Dummies X X X 
 
Industry*Year 
Dummies X X X 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
 
0.09 
Number of 
Observations 2,247 2,247 2,247 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases.  
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Appendix Table 11: 
Lawyer Experience on IPO Deals— 
First Day Price Increase 
 
Dependent Variable:  Opening Day Price Jump % 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
IPO Deals Done  
in the Past Year 
0.0013 
(0.0018) 
0.0013 
(0.002)     
 
Deals Done in 
the Past 2 Years   
0.0008 
(0.0011) 
0.0007 
(0.0011)   
 
Deals Done in 
the Past 3 Years     
0.0009 
(0.0009) 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
 
Log Gross 
Proceeds 
0.072*** 
(0.012) 
0.068*** 
(0.012) 
0.068*** 
(0.012) 
0.068*** 
(0.011) 
0.069*** 
(0.011) 
0.049*** 
(0.014) 
 
Repeated Past 
Client 
Interactions in 
Corresponding 
Number of 
Years 
 
0.049*** 
(0.0116) 
 
0.029* 
(0.013) 
 
0.033*** 
(0.008) 
 
0.019* 
(0.008) 
 
0.024*** 
(0.006) 
 
0.012+ 
(0.007) 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Industry* Year 
Dummies 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Bank  
Dummies 
  X  
 
X  
 
X 
 
Adj. R2 
 
0.20 
 
0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.26 
 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
2,725 
 
2,719 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.  
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions testing whether the results in the main specification are driven by the law firm’s level of 
recent experience (and thus are selection-driven).  Law firm experience is measured by the number of IPOs done by a particular law firm 
within the past 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years.  The number of deals is a variable constructed by looking at the number of IPOs done by the 
law firm in the relevant timespan prior to the offer date of every IPO that comprises an observation.  Industry and year-fixed effects, as 
well as a fixed effect for the interaction of year and industry, are used to isolate the effect of lawyer experience regardless of industry and 
time period.  As shown, the effect of law firm deal experience in the recent past (accounting for industry and time period) is very small and 
disappears when the variable for repeated interactions is introduced as a control.  The same analysis with respect to other outcomes of 
interest yields similar results, but is not reported here for space economy. 
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Appendix Table 12: 
Price Performance and Counsel Experience 
(by Number of Recent Deals) 
 
Dependent Variable:  Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index 
 
  30-Day   60-Day   90-Day  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Deals 
Done in 
the Past 
Year 
 
 
0.0021 
(0.0035) 
  
 
0.0090 
(0.0060) 
  
 
0.0071 
(0.006) 
  
Deals 
Done in 
the Past 2 
Years 
 
 
0.0014 
(0.0024)   
0.0054 
(0.0038)   
0.0055 
(0.0042) 
 
Deals 
Done in 
the Past 3 
Years 
  
0.0021 
(0.0018)   
0.0054 
(0.0029)   
0.0053 
(0.003) 
 
 
Industry 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
IPO Year 
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
Industry*
Year  
Dummies 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
Adj. R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
Number 
of 
Observa-
tions 
2,719 2,719 2,719 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,714 2,714 2,714 
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level, 
respectively.  The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as 
being a manager in such cases.  
 
